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ABSTRACT
IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Jorge Caballe Vilella 
Beth Allen
The first part of this dissertation, titled "Strategic Behavior 
and Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets", studies the effects of 
changes in the precision of both public and private information in 
financial markets in which traders are not price-takers but act 
strategically. Two different mechanisms of price formation are 
considered. The first one is a mechanism with market orders and 
competitive market makers. The second one is based on limit orders and 
market clearing. Under both regimes, the disclosure of more public 
information increases the expected profits of liquidity traders at the 
expense of privately informed agents. These results are potentially 
changed in two cases: when the acquisition of private information is 
costly and when the disclosure requirements are not uniform across firms 
and we allow for discretionary liquidity traders. The implications for 
price volatility, trading volume, incentives to produce private 
information, efficiency of associations of investors and mechanism 
design are explored.
In the second part (a joint work with Murugappa Krishnan) 
titled "Insider Trading and Asset Pricing in an Imperfectly Competitive
v
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Multi-Security Market", we study a multi-security financial market in a 
correlated environment with asymmetric information and imperfect 
competition, in which market makers learn about each return from every 
order flow, even as an informed trader manipulates what they can learn. 
Our model is a  generalization of a single-security model by Kyle. In 
contrast to a previous analysis by Admati under perfect competition, 
where the effect of a correlated environment is only to generate various 
ambiguities, strategic behavior restores various theoretical 
regularities, and can "neutralize" all of the correlatedness arising 
from the structure of returns and liquidity noise. Even with imperfect 
private information, strategic behavior helps generate an equilibrium 
with simpler structure, which is valuable for applications, especially 
for justifying traditional event study procedures even when there is 
private information.
vi
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Part 1
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
1
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1. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED LITERATURE
This paper studies the effects of public disclosure of 
information by firms about the return of the securities they issue.
More generally, I will study the effects of changes in the precision of 
both public and private information in financial markets. This problem 
has been addressed in several papers following the path-breaking work by 
Hirshleifer (1971). Among others, I mention the papers by Allen 
(1987b), Diamond (1985), Hakansson, Kunkel and Ohlson (1982), Ross 
(1979), Verrecchia (1582b) and Kyle (1984).
The papers by Allen, Diamond and Verrecchia are the ones that 
are most closely related to the present one. The difference between 
their approach and mine is that they assume a perfectly competitive 
financial market in the tradition of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). I will follow instead the paradigm 
pioneered by Kyle (1984, 1985, 1986), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Kihlstrom and Postlewaite (1983). These authors depart from the 
previous models by assuming that each agent in the market has a 
nonnegligible effect on prices and each agent takes into account this 
effect in order to formulate his optimal demand for risky asset. These 
models of imperfect competition seem appropriate to study the 
performance of thin markets with few traders who are aware of the fact 
that they can influence the equilibrium prices, markets with dominant
2
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traders, or markets with price setters (market makers) who make 
inferences from the observed demand in order to price the traded 
securities.
The traditional model of rational expectations with fully 
revealing prices, as stated by Grossman (1976, 1978, 1981a) Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1976) or Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975), has been subject to 
several criticisms. The first problem raised by Beja (1977) and 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) refers to the incentives to use private 
information in such markets. If the equilibrium price becomes a 
sufficient statistic for all the information in the market, then there 
are no incentives for the agents to use their private information, 
especially if this information is costly. Agents can observe the 
equilibrium price and make all the relevant inferences from this 
sufficient statistic. But if all the agents disregard their private 
information, then prices cannot aggregate all the existing information 
in the economy. This paradox has been solved in two different ways.
First, Grossman (1977) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
eliminate the possibility of fully revealing prices by introducing a 
source of noise that is uncorrelated with the return of the risky asset. 
In this case, prices depend on the realizations of both private signal 
and noise. Thus, Grossman and Stiglitz show that there are still 
incentives to become informed because not all the private information is 
revealed to the uninformed agents through the price system. There have 
been several stories that justify the existence of noise in financial 
markets. We can associate this noise with a random supply of risky 
asset or with the random demand for asset made by agents that are
3
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liquidity constrained or whose trading is determined exclusively by 
life-cycle reasons.
Another solution to the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox comes from 
the work by Milgrom (1981) which specifies the extensive form of a 
second-price auction for a single object. In this auction, prices are 
submitted first by the bidders and afterwards the auctioneer selects the 
second highest price as the one at which the transaction is carried out. 
The agent who gets the object is the agent who has submitted the highest 
bid. Given this sequence of moves, bidders are forced to use their 
(probably costly) private information even if the equilibrium price 
becomes fully revealing1.
Another criticism to the models with fully revealing prices 
comes from the fact that if the number of agents is finite and agents 
know how prices are formed, then they should act strategically in order 
to manipulate the equilibrium price.
Because the price taking assumption in markets with few agents 
leads to the "schizophrenic behavior" problem posed by Hellwig (1980), 
the (noisy) rational expectations literature in financial markets has 
focused on large markets with a continuum of agents, each of them with 
negligible weight with respect to the whole market.
The solution of these problems suggested by the literature on 
. imperfect competition that I will follow uses partially some of the
The equilibrium price in Milgrom (1981) is an order statistic. 
Usually, order statistics are not sufficient, but Milgrom is able to 
provide an example of auction whose equilibrium price reveals all the 
private information.
4
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ideas mentioned above. For instance, several models by Kyle (1984,
1985, 1986) have a  source of noise (due to liquidity constrained 
traders) that prevents prices from being fully revealing so that 
informed agents still have incentives to participate in the market.
Another feature of Kyle’s models is that, as in Milgrom 
(1981), the price is selected at the end of the auction. However, the 
strategic variables for the agents are not prices anymore but quantities 
(Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a) and Kyle (1985)) or demand schedules 
(Jackson (1988) and Kyle (1986)). Therefore, given this extensive form 
of the game, agents are forced to use their private information in the 
first stage of the game.
Finally, the most important departure from the noisy rational 
expectations literature is that the price taking assumption is relaxed. 
The number of informed agents is assumed finite and these agents behave 
strategically because they know the mechanism by which the prices are 
formed.
As I have mentioned, Allen (1987b), Diamond (1985) and 
Verrecchia (1982b) have studied the issue of the value of information in 
financial markets in the context of a noisy rational expectation economy 
with perfect competition, in which agents are characterized by constant 
absolute risk aversion utility functions and all random variables are 
normally distributed. Even though the computations are somewhat 
involved, these authors are able to give explicit solutions to the 
equilibrium and to sign the effects of their comparative statics 
experiments.
The Allen and Diamond models yield different predictions about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the effects of public information on non-liquidity traders’ welfare. 
These results depend on the way in which noise is introduced. An 
additional significant factor is that the private information is common 
to all informed agents in Allen’s paper whereas it is diverse in 
Diamond’s case.
Verrecchia (1982b) points out the difficulty of answering the 
question about the value of public or private information. He argues 
that slightly changing the scenarios and the sequence of events of the 
models would change the results dramatically. An interesting analysis 
in Verrecchia’s paper refers to the incentives to acquire private 
information when more public information is available. His results say 
that the disclosure of public information reduces the amount of 
information produced privately.
On the other hand, Kyle (1984) studies the effects of 
disclosing a public signal in an imperfectly competitive financial 
market. His analysis focuses on a futures market for an agricultural 
good where the return on the future depends on the positions taken by 
speculative traders and the random demand for the good made by 
non-speculative consumers. He closes the model by using a market 
clearing condition in which the price of the good is determined after 
the speculative round of trade is concluded and the stochastic demand is 
revealed. On the contrary, the market I will consider is like the one 
modeled by Diamond (1985) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988): a market for 
an asset with a random return that is independent of the actions taken 
by the speculative traders during the round of trade. However, Kyle’s 
results about the effects of public information are similar to mine.
6
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Some of the questions addressed in previous papers are 
analyzed here in the context of imperfectly competitive financial 
markets. I will focus mainly on a market with a finite number of agents 
who own diverse pieces of private information. Liquidity constrained 
agents are the source of noise in this market. The mechanism of price 
formation is modeled in two different ways. I first consider a model 
with competitive market makers who select a price equal to the expected 
return of the risky asset conditional on all information available to 
them. The strategic variables of informed agents are quantities (market 
orders) of risky asset that they want to buy or sell. Secondly, I 
briefly study a model that resembles the traditional noisy rational 
expectations model with perfect competition in which prices are formed 
by automatic market clearing after all demand functions (limit 
orders) are submitted. Most of my results hold irrespective of the 
mechanism under consideration.
One shortcoming of my approach is that, as in Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988a), Easley and O ’Hara (1987), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and Kyle (1985), for tractability I assume that participants in the 
market are risk neutral. Risk neutrality negates some results in the 
previous literature. However, this exercise has intrinsic value because 
provides an explicit equilibrium for a case where perfect competitive 
equilibrium fails to exist. If the risk neutral agents (indexed by n) 
are price takers and observe a signal s about the return v of an asset, 
their demand will be xn = -oo if E(v|s ) < p, x = oo if E(v|s ) > p or 
Xn = ^-0°’ +“  ̂  ̂ = P* Only in the improbable case in which s
= s for all n, does equilibrium exist. In this case, p = E(v|s) is the
7
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equilibrium price.
With imperfect competition the "generic" non-existence result 
is changed because agents take into account their effects on prices.
Each agent reduces his intensity of reaction to private information in 
order to reduce the amount of information revealed to the market maker 
or to other agents. The revelation of information would push the prices 
up when informed agents receive good news and eliminate part of the 
profits that the agents would obtain if prices did not react to 
individual actions.
Furthermore, the assumption of risk neutrality complements the 
imperfect competition assumption. In thin markets with few agents, 
usually the traders are agents who are either (wealthy) insiders or 
mutual funds with very high risk bearing capacity. A further advantage 
of the risk neutrality assumption is that permits one to concentrate 
exclusively on strategic interactions among participants in the 
financial market.
The several aspects and results of the paper are summarized as
follows:
I model public information, as in Diamond (1985) or Kyle 
(1984), assuming that all agents are able to observe a common signal 
about the return of the risky asset in addition to their private 
signals. More precise public information makes informed agents worse 
off because it dissipates the informational advantage of these agents 
with respect to the liquidity traders, even if their relative 
informational position with respect to the market maker and other 
strategic traders remains unchanged. More public information makes the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
market more liquid, i.e., prices becomes less sensitive to order flows. 
This in turn implies a transfer of expected profits from informed 
traders to liquidity traders.
My above result is potentially changed in two cases. First, 
if private information is costly, the number of informed agents 
decreases when more precise public information is disclosed. This 
implies that the new equilibrium will involve less competition among 
insiders. This new equilibrium may generate less surplus for liquidity 
traders. Secondly, liquidity traders in a multi-securities world are
attracted to the most liquid market. This fact alters camouflage
opportunities across markets.
I study the effects of more precise information release on the
behavior of the price process and the expected volume of transactions
done by the market maker. The volatility of prices increases in an 
economy where public information is more intensively released, because 
prices can more accurately replicate returns. The expected volume of 
the market maker’s trade decreases as public information becomes more 
precise in the market orders model.
Private information exhibits decreasing returns in my models. 
Too much private diverse information may be harmful to informed agents. 
This result does not hold in the market orders model with common private 
information across agents. In this case, the informed agents’ advantage 
with respect to the market maker always increases.
Another issue studied here concerns the efficiency of 
syndicates of investors. I consider two kinds of associations of 
investors: associations in which its members precommit ex ante to share
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
their private information and associations that submit collective 
demands on behalf of its members. The relative efficiency of these 
associations from the point of view of the informed agents is 
independent of the precision of public information.
I also study the performance of a very stylized monopolistic 
market for information. For markets with a single insider who can 
produce private information, the induced charge of incentives to produce 
private information when further public information is released depends 
on the average cost of producing such private information.
Finally, I obtain the following comparison result: if private 
information is very precise compared to the public information, then 
informed agents are better off when the price is determined by 
competitive risk neutral market makers than when it is formed by 
automatic market clearing. The converse is true for liquidity traders. 
This result is a consequence of the decreasing returns associated with 
private information and the information sharing involved in the limit 
orders model.
The paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents a model with market orders and market 
makers. This model has also two kinds of agents: informed agents and 
liquidity traders. I obtain the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the 
proposed game when there is available a piece of public information 
modeled like in Diamond (1985).
Section 3 derives some welfare implications of increasing the 
precision of public information when the private information is free and 
when it is costly.
10
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Section 4 studies some empirical implications of releasing 
public information on price volatility and volume of trade done by the 
market maker.
Section 5 modifies the previous model by introducing 
discretionary liquidity traders that choose optimally in which market 
they will submit their demands.
Section 6 analyses the effects of increasing the precision of 
private information.
Section 7 considers the case of common private information. 
This case is useful in order to analyze the performance of a 
monopolistic market for information (Section 8) and the efficiency of 
associations of investors (Section 9).
Section 10 considers a different model of price formation in 
the same spirit as in Jackson (1988) and Kyle (1986). The equilibrium 
price is defined by market clearing where agents’ strategies are demand 
functions (limit orders). The comparative statics experiments of 
sections 3, 4 and 6 are performed for the new model in Section 11.
Section 12 compares both mechanisms from the point of view of 
the expected profits of both types of agents.
Section 13 concludes the paper.
11
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2. THE MODEL WITH MARKET ORDERS AND COMPETITIVE MARKET MAKERS.
We are going to study the price formation of a single asset in 
a market with three kinds of agents: informed traders, noise traders and
market makers.
There are T liquidity Cor noise) traders, indexed by t, in the
market. The noise traders either buy or sell quantities of risky asset
motivated by liquidity constraints. These liquidity constraints can be
justified by life-cycle reasons and other needs that arise outside the
financial market. The important feature of the behavior of these
liquidity traders is that they trade for reasons that are not related to
the payoff of financial asset. I will assume that the net demand z for
. shares of each liquidity trader t is normally distributed. Without loss
of generality, assume that zt has zero mean and variance equal to <r2 for
all t, and Cov(z . z ) = 0 for m * k. Therefore, the total net demand T m k
z = E  z for shares by the liquidity traders, is normally distributed
U  l
with zero mean and variance cr2, where <r2 = Ter2 > 0.
Alternatively, interpret the noise z as a random supply 
of risky asset (cf. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1981), among others). In this case I do not need to worry 
about the welfare implications on the liquidity traders of our 
comparative statics.
Finally, I must say that the amount of noise parameterized by 
the variance cr2 may be very small, but in any case I need it in order
12
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to avoid having fully revealing prices.
There are N informed traders (indexed by n) in the market who 
trade on the basis of private information about the future payoff of the
risky asset. They are not aware of the exact needs of the liquidity
constrained traders. However, they know the parameters of the 
distribution of the total net demands z for shares by the noise traders.
I consider a single asset whose expected return v is normally 
distributed with mean v and precision (the inverse of the variance) 
equal to x e (0, co). Each informed trader receives a piece of private 
information that takes the form of a signal s where s = v + e . The 
noise c of the signal is also normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision x^ > 0 for all n (i.e., s is informative about the return v).
I assume that the firm issuing the asset can be forced by law 
to disclose at no cost reliable information about the expected return of 
the asset. I disregard the direct costs of producing information and 
the indirect cost of disclosing reliable information using costly 
signals as dividends (Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985)) or 
capital structure (Ross (1977)). This assumption allows one to focus 
exclusively on the effects of public information on the stock market 
traders’ welfare. Specifically, as in Diamond (1985), I assume that the 
firm is enforced to release a public signal s q that takes the form
5o -  ^ + So '
where e q has a normal distribution, with zero mean and precision tq > 0.
We can imagine that the level of precision t q can be enforced 
by the legislator in the following way. The firm must be audited and
13
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the auditor has to release all the information that he is able to 
obtain. The precision tq is controlled ex ante by establishing the 
different activities of the firm that should be audited. By enlarging 
the set of audited activities, the precision x q is increased. All the 
participants in the market observe the realization of sq before the 
transactions are conducted.
I assume that (v, z, .....e^, eQ) are mutually independent
random variables.
Denote the optimal demand of the informed trader n  as 
x = x (s , s ) where x (...) is a measurable function of s and s 2.
n n n 0 n n 0
Note that the demands are not allowed to be contingent on prices; this
possibility will be studied in Section 10. Note also that x (*,•)
denotes the demand strategy, x is the quantity demanded as a random
variable, and x denotes the realization of this random variable.
All informed traders are assumed to be risk neutral, that is 
to say, they only care about maximizing the expected future payoff.
This assumption is consistent with the behavior of mutual funds that 
have a very diversified portfolio and that are risk neutral as a group.
Our model has two periods. In period 1 each trader submits 
market orders to a market maker who is also assumed to be risk neutral. 
The market maker establishes a price p for the risky asset once he has 
observed the total net quantity demanded by the traders and the public 
signal. It is important to note that the market maker only observes
2 Given the assumptions on the pricing rule below (mainly, 
linearity), mixed strategies are never optimal for insiders.
14
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"total demands". Thus, he cannot know if an order comes from an 
informed trader or from a noise trader.
I assume competition among market makers. This competition 
among price setters forces them to select a price such that they earn 
zero expected profits . The reasons for this are exactly the same that 
force price to equate the marginal cost in the Bertrand model of 
oligopolistic competition. The market maker is prepared to buy or sell 
any amount of risky asset that is supplied or demanded3 . Neither the 
market maker nor the informed agent have short-selling constraints.
Thus, a market maker must sell v shares where w is the net 
total order flow
N
w = £  x n (sn> sQ ) + z . (2.1)
The zero profit condition (or market efficiency condition)
implies that
p = p(w, sQ) = E(v|w, SQ) . (2.2)
The price selected equals the expected return conditional on 
all information available to the market maker. The market maker uses
the order flow to make inferences about v because it contains part of
The assumption of competitive market makers is consistent with 
the institutional arrangements of the Over-tne-counter (OTC) market or 
the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) that forces competition between the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) monopolistic specialists and regional 
specialists. For other rules of dynamic market making with inventory 
costs, see Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Garman (1976) or O ’Hara and 
Oldfield (1986).
15
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the private information owned by informed agents4.
Prices are random variables that are measurable with 
respect to order flows and the public signals. p(.,.), p and p denote 
the pricing rule, the equilibrium price as a random variable and the 
realization of this random variable respectively.
In period 2, the realization of v is observed and each agent 
receives his payoff.
This sequence of events to determine price formation looks 
like the one used by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a), Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) Easley and O ’Hara (1987), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Gould and Verrecchia (1985) and Kyle (1985) and resembles the structure 
proposed by the already classical paper of Kreps and Wilson (1982) on 
sequential equilibrium. But my approach follows more closely the 
articles by Kyle and Admati and Pfleiderer because I assume that the 
market maker selects a single price after he has observed the order
A third possible Justification of the random variable z is to 
assume that there is some noise in the communication channel between the 
informed speculators and the market maker. This means that the^market 
maker is only able to observe a garbled order flow. Obviously z must be 
again uncorrelated to all other random variables.
16
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flow.5
Gould and Verrecchia (1985) alter this sequence of events. In 
their paper the market maker selects the price first and afterwards the 
informed agents submit demands conditional on price and private 
information6.
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Easley and O ’Hara (1987) and 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) study the possibility of bid-ask 
spreads (i.e., a buying price and a selling one) in a dynamic setup. 
Glosten and Milgrom, for instance, assume that in each period of time 
there is only the possibility of buying or selling a unit of asset. 
From this observed behavior, the market maker infers part of the 
information contained in the order flow using updating bayesian rules. 
The agent who submits the market order in each period is selected 
randomly and can be either an informed trader or a noise trader. With 
this structure the market maker can select only two contingent prices 
(the selling price and the buying one) before the order flow is 
observed. Finally , the possibility of sequential learning by the 
market maker is not analyzed in our (essentially) one-period model.
6 In Gould and Verrecchia (1985) the assumption of risk aversion 
cannot be relaxed, because the price is fixed by the specialist first 
and risk neutrality would lead informed traders to take infinite 
positions in the risky asset held by.
17
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The following table summarizes the sequence of events: 
Table 1 —  Time Structure of the Market Orders Model
Date 1. a) -  The public signal sq =  v + e Q is announced and 
observed by everybody.
- The informed agents observe s = v + e  .
-  The liquidity traders observe their financial 
needs z .
b) -  The informed agents submit net demands x ( s  ,s )
n n 0
conditional on public and private information to 
the market maker.
-  The liquidity traders submit their net demands z
c) -  The market maker selects a price that equates the 
expected return conditional to the public signal 
and the order flow, p =  E(v|w, sq ).
d) -  Transactions are carried out at the price selected 
by the market maker in c). All the demands are 
absorbed by the market maker.
Date 2 -  The return v is revealed and each agent receives 
this return multiplied by the quantity of asset 
bought on Date 1.
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2.B. Equilibrium.
Only informed traders make strategic decisions in the model. 
They want to maximize expected profits conditional on their information.
The optimal demand for risky asset of informed agent n is
Xn^Sn’ V  = argmax E [[^ ~ P 50j]x |sn> S0J
The Nash equilibrium of the game we are studying consists of N  
strategies ^(s^, s q ), n = 1 that maximize the expected profits 
for each informed trader, given the observed signals, and a price 
function p(w, sq) that makes the expected profits of the market maker 
equal to zero for each pair of public signal and order flow.
I restrict attention to linear and symmetric equilibria, 
where xnC®n . s q) and p(w, s q ) are linear functions7. The question of 
existence of nonlinear equilibria in this setup remains unanswered but 
seems implausible under Gaussian assumptions.
The proofs make extensive use of the following lemma which is 
a version of the projection theorem for normally distributed random 
variables.
7 For nonlinear equilibria under different distributional 
assumptions, see Gale and Hellwig (1987) and Laffont and Maskin (1988).
19
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LEMMA 2.1: Let v, be normally and independently distributed
random variables with E(v) = v and E(ufc) = 0 ,  (k = 1 K) and
precisions t ,̂ respectively.
Then:
^Var (v | v +  v + ur) J TV + 2
r , xv v + S Tk( v + vE(*R * 5* 5 * 5J ^ --
Tv * 2  Tk=l k
Proof: It follows from DeGroot (1970, p. 55).
Now, I can state now my first result:
PROPOSITION 2.2: There exists a unique symmetric, linear equilibrium
which is given by
p = p(w, sQ) = S + Aw + yso ,
and
x = x(s , s ) = a + ,3s + Ks ,
where
20
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Proof: See the appendix. ■
Note that the equilibrium can be written in the following way:
[ t v + t s ]  f .." V r + x ° = P[V  E(̂ l̂ o)J ’ (2>3)
T V + X S
p(w, so) = + ° ° + Aw = E(v|sq) + Aw . (2.4)
v o
The quantities demanded by each agent depend on the deviation 
of the private information with respect to the posterior expectation 
after observing the public signal. On the other hand, the price of the
asset will be equal to the posterior expectation after observing s q plus
21
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a term that embodies the information contained in the order flow.
It is straightforward to prove that the unconditional 
expectation ECx^Cs^, sq)) of individual demands is equal to zero and, 
from this, that E(p(v, sq)) = v, i.e., prices are unbiased estimates 
of returns.
Equation (2.3) and (2.4) imply that analyzing the effects of 
the disclosure of public information is am equivalent problem to 
studying the effects of a reduction in the variance of the prior 
distribution of v.
The coefficient A in Proposition 2.2 is the inverse of the 
depth of the market, according to Kyle’s (1985) terminology. In other 
words, 1/A measures the order flow required to change the price of the 
risky asset by one dollar. By inspection, A is decreasing in t q. 
Therefore the depth of the market is increasing in tq. This reflects 
the fact that, when more public information is available, market maker’s 
inferences are less dependent on the order flow. The next section gives 
a more detailed explanation of this important fact.
3. THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC INFORMATION.
3.A. Free private information.
The welfare effects of public disclosure of information by 
firms are parameterized by t q. Higher values of t q mean more stringent 
disclosure requirements. Our analysis requires computation of expected
22
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profits for both types of agents before the realizations of the random 
variables are observed.
COROLLARY 3.1: Expected profits of informed traders are
For a liquidity constrained individual trader t (before he is 
able to observe his liquidity needs), expected profits are
ECir1) = - AE(z2) =
Proof: For the informed traders, compute
E(7in) = e|\v - p)xj = e|\v - S - Aw - rsQ)(a + + KSQ)j
where w  is defined in (2.1) and (a, /3, k , 5, A, y) are given in 
Proposition 2.2.
For the liquidity constrained traders compute
E[(v - p)zj = e [[v - 5 - xn zj - ySQ]zJ
to obtain, after some algebra, the expressions given in the Corollary.
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An alternative (and easier) proof consists of computing the 
T t 2total profits £ E(rr ) == -Acr of noise traders. This, together with the
t = i z
zero profit condition for the market maker, implies that total expected 
profits for insiders are equal to the negative of total expected profits 
of liquidity traders. Therefore the expected profits of each insider 
are equal to — rp. ■
Inspection of (3.1) and (3.2) clearly shows that expected 
profits for liquidity constrained traders are always negative and 
increasing in t q. The opposite is true for strategic traders.
When there is more public information available in the 
economy, informed agents want to keep their relative informational 
advantage with respect to the market maker. They can react to the 
arrival of more precise public information, putting more noise in the 
order flow in such a way that the market maker is not able to make as 
precise an inference as he could when the precision of the public signal 
was lower. In fact, the informational content of the order flow alone 
—  without considering the public signal —  is decreasing in t q. To see 
this, compute [Var(v|w)] 1 as a measure of the precision of the order 
. flow exclusively
[Var(v|w)]“ = t
which is clearly decreasing in t q. This shows that insiders modify 
their trading behavior in order to avoid revealing too much information
24
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to the market maker.
However, x as defined in the expression (A.9) of the appendix 
is a measure of the informational content of the order flow when the 
market maker observes both v and s q. Compute its equilibrium value, 
using the coefficients obtained in Proposition 2.2, to obtain
x (x ) = ------------------  , (3.3)
u 0 _ 1   + _2_
T + T Xv o e
which is increasing in x q. Therefore, the market maker’s overall 
informedness is increasing in xq for two reasons: he receives a more
precise public signal and he is able to make more accurate predictions 
about v when he observes w  together with s q.
Corollary (3.1) tells us that insiders cannot overcome the 
initial unfavorable shock of more precise public information. The 
market maker uses the public signal in a way that dissipates insiders’ 
informative advantage.
I have shown in the previous section that when public 
information becomes more precise, the market maker puts less weight in 
the order flow in order to estimate v (A is decreasing in xQ ). This 
means that the noise trading is not going to affect prices too much.
This is precisely what liquidity traders want.
If a liquidity trader has to sell shares, he wants to get the 
highest price for his supply. If the market maker is very sensitive to 
the order flow, he will interpret this supply as "bad news" about v and 
he will lower the equilibrium price. The same argument applies for a 
liquidity trader who wants to buy assets. Therefore, liquidity traders
25
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prefer to trade in deep markets (with low A) in order to minimize their 
cost of trading.
The implications of Corollary 3.1 are obvious. If there are 
no legal requirements about public disclosure of information, the 
decision about how much information is disclosed is endogenously taken 
by the firm. If I assume that the managers of the firm are the insiders 
of my model, then managers will precommit ex ante to a policy of no 
information disclosure. This is true even if the relative informational 
position of managers with respect to other traders remains unchanged.
On the other hand, any legal requirement about public 
disclosure will imply a transfer of expected profits from insiders to 
liquidity traders or vice versa.
3.B. Costly information acquisition
If I assume that the acquisition of information is costly and 
that there is free entry in the market, then the number of informed 
agents will be endogenously determined in equilibrium. The number of 
informed agents will be the one at which if an additional agent 
purchases the private signal, then his net expected profits will be 
negative.
Note that an agent who is not liquidity constrained and 
observes only the public signal has no incentives to enter in this 
market. The market maker may subtract the demands of these uninformed 
agents from the order flow. The informational content of this demands
26
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is already known by the market maker provided that uninformed agents can 
only formulate demands contingent on the public signal. Therefore, the 
equilibrium price will not depend on these agents’ demands. The 
difference between the expected return and the equilibrium price 
conditional on the public signal is always zero. Note that
W P ' V V I V  = ECEC?pI,505|50) = E(5|s0)
where is the order flow submitted by informed agents and by liquidity 
constrained traders exclusively. This means that uninformed agents’ 
demands are indeterminate, since their expected conditional profits are 
always equal to zero. I set the demands of these uninformed agents 
equal to zero as a mere convention.
The model of entry that I am using, assumes that informed 
agents and the market maker modify their strategies appropriately when a 
new insider enters8.
COROLLARY 3.2: If the cost of purchasing the signal s is c, where
t  + x x
If a potential entrant cannot credibly announce his presence in 
the market, then I have to compute his optimal strategy and 
corresponding profits assuming that the equilibrium strategies of the 
other insiders and the market maker remain unchanged. It can be shown 
that the comparative statics of this alternative model of entry are the 
same as in the one I am considering.
27
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then the number of informed traders, N  , is given by
N * = argmax jtf e IN | E(7rn(W, t q)) a cj- ,
where E(.nn(N, tq)) are expected profits of insiders when the number 
of insiders is N  and the precision of public information is t q.
Proof: Assumption (3.4) is necessary to allow the existence of at least
one informed trader. E(7in(W, t q)) is given in (3.1) and is cleanly 
strictly decreasing in N. Informed traders will enter in the market of 
the risky asset until
E(7tn(tf, t )) a c > E(irn(N + 1, r )) ■o o
Since E(nn (N, tq )) is decreasing in N, the number of informed 
traders is decreasing in c (not in a continuous basis given our 
"discrete" framework).
Moreover, since E (nn (N, tq )) is decreasing in tq, implicit 
differentiation proves that if the accuracy of public information 
released by firms increases then the number of informed traders tends to 
decrease. This means that legislation that forces firms to release 
public information reduces insider trading activity.
However, when the precision of public information increases, 
the effect on expected profits of liquidity traders is ambiguous for 
some values of t q. The next Corollary shows why this is possible.
28
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COROLLARY 3.3: The depth of the market (1/A) is increasing in N  if and
only if
Proof: It is immediate after computing the derivative of A with respect
to N. m
In order to interpret Corollary 3.3, it should noted that an 
increase in N has two opposite effects. First, it increases the 
informational content of order flows. This tends to increase A because 
the order flow becomes a more reliable signal about the expected return. 
Secondly, it increases the degree of competition among informed traders 
and this tends to reduce A.
The reason for this second effect is that A is the regression 
coefficient of w in the estimation of v against order flows and public 
signals. If all informed agents received the same signal, then w would 
have the same informational content regardless of N. Therefore, the 
market maker should scale down A to compensate the increased variance of
w  due to the larger number of informed agents.
The above exercise is fictitious because if the number of 
informed traders increases, then the "quality" of the signal improves: a 
new informed trader supplies a new signal about v and this new signal is
incorporated in the order flow. Therefore, the order flow becomes a
more informative signal for the market maker and thus he will put more 
weight on it (A will increase). This effect goes in the opposite
29
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direction relative to the one of increasing competition among informed 
traders.
Note that Corollary 3.3 tells us that when either the 
precision of informed traders is low or there are few insiders, it is 
very difficult for the market maker to make inferences about v. In this 
case, an increase in N has an important effect on the amount of 
information contained in the order flow and this effect dominates the 
effect of increasing competition, i.e., \ increases.
Assume now that the level of public information t q is such
that the net expected profits E(nn (.N, t q )) - c for the insiders are
equal to zero. In this case, if t q increases only a little bit, then
the number of informed agents in the market will decrease in one unit
and this has ambiguous effects on the depth of the market and therefore
on liquidity traders’ welfare. The reader may feel uncomfortable
because I am taking the derivative of X with respect to N where N  is a
natural number. I can compare directly the expected profits of
liquidity traders when there are N insiders with the profits when there
are N  - 1 of them for a given t .o
It can be proved that 
E(ttt (N, tq )) * EC/CJV - l, T q )) iff -4 (b2+b) + W2 - N  - 1 * 0 (3.5)
T + T
where b = — -----Te
Note that expected profits of an informed trader, and the 
number of informed agents in the market, are not only determined by b,
30
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but by both b and re9. Therefore, I have an extra degree of freedom 
that prevents us from signing the expression in the right hand side of 
(3.5).
Thus, I have shown that if the acquisition of private 
information is costly, then disclosure of further public information has 
ambiguous effects on the noise traders’ welfare, provided that the 
change in t q induces reductions in the number of informed agents 
participating in that market.
4. PRICE VOLATILITY AND TRADE VOLUME IMPLICATIONS.
In this section I derive some empirical implications of 
increasing the precision of public information. The experiment consists 
of comparing two markets with the same fundamentals (W, x£ , x ) and 
different precisions of the public signal, and compare the expected 
behavior of prices and trade volume in these two markets. I assume that 
private information is observable at no cost.
The level of price volatility is given by the variance of the
random variable p = S + Xw + ys 10. Replace w by its equilibrium value 
N °
( £  xn^ n> sQ) + z) and use the values of a, (3, >c, 5, \ and y in
9 For fixed b and c, the equilibrium number of informed traders is 
decreasing in t£ .
10 The variance of prices as a measure of volatility is to be 
interpreted as the variance of the equilibrium price in (independent) 
repeated rounds of trade. The same argument applies for the expected 
volume of trade.
31
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Proposition 2.2, to obtain
Var(p) =
where the first term of (4.1) incorporates the variance of p induced by 
the variance of the order flow and the second term incorporates the 
reaction of price to the arrival of public signals.
The first term is decreasing in tq because, as I have argued 
in Section 3, the order flow becomes a relatively more imprecise signal 
about v and then the market maker reduces the elasticity of the price 
with respect to order flows. Moreover, the random variable w has less 
variance now (see below). When tq increases the market maker puts more 
weight in the public signal (y is increasing in t q ) and, even if the 
variance of sq is smaller, the second term in (4.1) is increasing in t q.
The reader will notice that it should appear a third term in 
(4.1) involving Cov(w, sq). It turns out that this covariance is equal 
to zero in equilibrium. The reason is that the insiders’ demands and 
the pricing rule depend on the deviation of the random variables s and 
w from their expected values conditional on s q. The combination of the 
pricing rule with the insiders’ optimal behavior rules out any 
correlation between order flows and public signals.
It can be shown that the derivative of Var(p) with respect to 
tq is always positive. This is the logical result if we have in mind 
the discussion in Section 3.A. I showed there that the overall 
informedness of the market maker was increasing in t q. This means that
32
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the market maker will be able to predict more accurately the realization 
of v, i.e., the variance of p will approach the variance of v. Notice 
that the variance of v is the upper bound of Var(p) because
Var(p) = Var^E(v|w, sQ)j £ Var(v) = - i-  , 
and, from (4.1), it is obvious that lim Var(p) = —
T ->00 Vo
Surprisingly, Var(p) is independent of the noise variance <r2. 
The reason is that when the level of noise increases, the insiders have 
more camouflage and they trade more actively based upon private 
information, so that they leave unchanged the precision of the order 
flow as a signal of v.
This result gives us another normative argument about the
desirability of public disclosure of information and about the
incentives to disclose information by firms. Following Fishman and
Hagertv (1388), I can assume that there are Q original shareholders
before date 1 who want to cancel their positions in the firm. After
trading has been conducted, the original shareholder q will receive a
payoff equal to p-0 where 0 is the number of shares that this q q
shareholder owned11. If those shareholders are risk averse, their 
expected utility will be obviously decreasing in Var(p). If the
In this case the total order flow has mean equal to the total 
0
number of shares £ 0 held by the original Q stockholders. According
q=i q
to my assumptions, only deviations from this mean will be informative 
for the market maker.
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
managers of the firm want to maximize the expected utility of current
shareholders, they will commit themselves to a policy of no information
disclosure because this is the policy that minimizes the variance of
stock prices. In fact, a legislation that forces disclosure reduces the
insurance opportunities for the original stockholders. If those
stockholders were risk neutral, then they are indifferent between
alternative disclosure policies.
Another testable implication I obtain refers to the intensity
of the market maker’s activity. As I have said, the market maker has an
expected position equal to zero. However, we can use as a measure of
trading volume processed by the market maker the absolute value of w
(that is the net demand presented to the market maker).
We know that for a normally distributed random variable x with 
1
zero mean, E|x| = ^  where is the standard deviation of x.
Thus, the expected volume of trade done by the market maker is given by
E(l°  = [“I -] ^  Var(w) . (4.2)
COROLLARY 4. 1: The expected volume of trade done by the market maker is
decreasing in t q.
Proof: The standard deviation of the order flow is
/ Var(w) = y C a r J  xn(sn> sQ)+zj = yVarj^ £ sQ)j + <r̂ ,
and only the first term under the root is potentially sensible to 
changes in t q . Evaluate the variance of the informed agents’ aggregate
34
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demand in equilibrium, to obtain
x (s , s ) = Var(Mx + Np £ s + Nk s  )
N 1_
TT +
2 '0 e (4.3)= <r 1+ T'0 e
that is obviously strictly decreasing in tq when N  > 1 and constant for 
= 1. ■
The intuition behind this result is that the market maker has 
to trade to compensate for insiders’ demands that are not matched by 
other insiders’ demands. This means that the market maker matches only 
the demands submitted by insiders that have drawn extreme signals. When 
the precision of the public signal increases, informed agents react less 
aggressively to their private signals. This reduces the occurrence of 
“unmatched" demands. This means that there will be less expected trade 
crossed between informed agents and the market maker.
5. STRATEGIC LIQUIDITY TRADERS.
All my previous results rely crucially on the fact that noise 
traders’ behavior is independent of the values of the parameters in the 
model. Specifically, I was assuming that is independent of t q.
I show in this section how the previous results change when I
35
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relax the previous assumption in a two-security world example. I will
also assume that disclosure requirements Eire not uniform across firms.
Assume that there are two securities s = 1, 2, traded in two
different markets. The random returns v and v of these securities are1 2
uncorrelated. In each market there are N  distinct informed traders who 
receive signals about security v_ of the form s = v + e ,
n = 1 N  , s = 1, 2. For each security, the statistical properties
of the random variables Vs and are exactly as in section 2.
There is also a piece of public information s = v + e0s s Os
about the return of each security, with again the same statistical 
properties as in section 2.
In each market there are T distinct nondiscretionary 
liquidity traders indexed by t. Each nondiscretionary liquidity trader 
in market s has to trade an amount of shares of security s equal to the 
random variable z , where z ~ W(0, <rZ) for t = 1,...,T , and s = 1,2.St St s s
There are also D discretionary liquidity traders indexed by d. 
Each discretionary liquidity trader has to trade an amount of shares 
equal to the realization of the random variable yd where yd ~ N[0, ov|)
for d = 1 D. However, each discretionary liquidity trader is free
to choose in which market he will trade. For the sake of simplicity I 
will assume that each liquidity trader can only trade in a  single
36
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market12.
Finally, I assume that
z.'IT1
are normal and mutually independent random variables with means
(vt, v2),(o... 0),(0... 0),(0, 0), (0,. .. ,0), (0... 0),(0....0)
Define the random variable z = £  z . Thus, z ~ W(0, <r2 )s t=i st
where o-2 = T <r2.
ZS S 3
Define h = £  y where D is the set of discretionarys deD s
liquidity traders who choose to trade in security s.
In each market the price is selected by different risk neutral
market makers who make zero expected profits.
If the discretionary traders can split their net demands among 
several markets, it can be shown that the proportion of shares traded in 
each market is proportional to the depth of the market (see Bhushan 
(1988) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) in a different context).
and variances
T
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The equilibrium pricing rule in each market is given by 
p (v , s ) = 5 + A w + y s ,s s Os s s s s 0
Ns
where ws = £  xn^Sns’ + 2 s + demand of an
informed agent is x (s , s ) = a + 13 s + k  s , n  = 1 N  .n ns Os s s n s 0 s
The optimal values of a^, (3 , k  , S^, A and y are as in
Proposition 2.2, replacing r , r , x and <r2 by x , x , x and v o e z vs Os es
jo*2 + Var(h )j respectively.
Profits of both informed traders and nondiscretionary 
liquidity traders are similar to those in (3.1) and (3.2) with the 
appropriate relabelling (again, cr2 must be replaced by cr2 + Van(h )).
Expected profits (before observing y  ) of discretionary 
liquidity traders who choose to trade in security s are
E(nd) = -  As o-2 d e Dg (5. 1)
The following lemma is an adaptation of Proposition 1 in 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988a).
LEMMA 5.2: There exists generically a unique equilibrium in which all
discretionary liquidity trading is concentrated in the same market.
Proof: From (5.1), expected profits of discretionary traders are
maximized when is the smallest. If the market maker follows the 
equilibrium pricing rule, informed agents behave optimally and all the 
discretionary liquidity traders trade in market s, then the value of A 
will be
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Choose the security s* e {1, 2} that minimizes X (ff). Assume 
' without loss of generality that s* = 1. It is an equilibrium for all 
discretionary traders to choose security 1 to trade, because
X ( H )  £ X J H )  < A (0).1 2  2
To prove genericity, note that if it happens that 
discretionary agents want to split their demand, this is because 
X^(H) = X^iH). Any small change on the parameters x ^ ,  xQg, o*^, tr̂
(s = 1,2) will imply X ^ H )  * A (ff). ■
The security s that minimizes X (H ) is an endogenous variable 
that depends on the level of public information in each market. If, for 
instance, the firm that issues security s (different from s ) is forced 
to make more precise disclosures of public information, then tqg 
increases and security s may become eventually the one that minimizes 
X (H). In this case, all discretionary liquidity trading is 
automatically concentrated in security s.
Informed agents in the market for security s* (the market 
where the trading was concentrated previously) suffer a  loss because 
there is less noise trading providing camouflage. Define n^(y» tq ) as 
the expected profits of informed agents in market s when the variance 
VarCh^) of discretionary trading is equal to y, and the precision of
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
public information is tq. It is easy to see that
7tnA H ,  t ) > 7in (0, t ) . s* Os* s* Os*
Moreover, nondiscretionary liquidity traders in market s 
experiment also a loss, because now this market is less liquid. Note 
that A AH, t ) < A .(0, t ) where A ( - , 0  is defined similarly tos* Os* s* Os* '
7T̂ ( * , • ) .
With respect to the market for security s, in which all
discretionary trading is concentrated now, the results are the
following. When the precision of public information increases from
to T'^ in such a way that all discretionary trading is attracted to
security s, I have to compare A (0, t  ) with A (tf, ) in order to s Os s Os
evaluate the effects on nondiscretionary liquidity traders’ welfare. It 
is easy to see that Ag(y, t Qs ) is strictly decreasing in both variables, 
and this implies that As(0, > ^s (H, f^). This means that expected
profits of nondiscretionary liquidity traders increase.
On the other hand, the results for informed agents in market s 
are ambiguous. We have to decide whether nn(H, T' ) is greater than 
< (0. T0s)- <(...) is increasing in the first term and decreasing in
the second one. The comparison between expected profits will depend on 
the magnitude of H and on the increment of tq necessary to induce the 
concentration of all discretionary trading in market s.
From the point of view of discretionary liquidity traders, the 
increase from t qs to T'g makes them better off, because they are able to 
trade in a deeper market.
Note also that the results I obtained in Section 4 referred to
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volume of trade done by the market maker in market s are modified 
substantially. Assume that when the precision increases from t q^ to 
T'g, all discretionary liquidity trading that was concentrated in market 
s shifts to market s, and use the same measure of volume of trade as in 
Section 4. Then, we have to compare
N
Note that Ej^Cy, tq)J is increasing in y, and decreasing in 
tq. Therefore, the comparison is ambiguous and depends on the values of 
H, t  and .Os Os
When public information becomes more precise, discretionary 
liquidity trading is concentrated in market s and this implies greater 
expected volume of trade. The effect on the expected volume of trade 
crossed between insiders and market maker is ambiguous. I have already 
shown that if the variance of noise is constant, then the expected 
volume of trade is decreasing in t q. However, if the variance of 
liquidity trading increases, then there is more camouflage provided by 
the noise. In this case, insiders will react more sharply to private 
information, and so increase the expected volume of trade. The dominant
41
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effect is ambiguous.
The results about volatility of prices obtained in Section 4 
remain unchanged because Var(p) is independent of the noise variance, as 
can be seen from (4.1)
6. THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE INFORMATION.
I have shown that more public information makes informed 
agents worse off. This may also be the case when more precise private 
information becomes available. We can imagine the endowments of private 
information as signals coming from informational leaks in the firm 
issuing the security. I am still assuming that each agent has access to 
a different source of information with independent noise e . The case 
of common information will be studied in the next section.
It can be proved that for some parameters of the model, more 
private information (in the sense of more precision obtained from the 
leaks) may make informed agents worse off. More precisely, I can state 
the following Corollary:
COROLLARY 6. 1: Expected profits of informed agents are decreasing in rifr (¥] 2 <*. - v-
Proof: It follows immediately from evaluating the derivative of E(7rn)
in (3.1) with respect to t £ . a
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There is an initial positive effect for the insiders of having 
more precise private information: their informational position with
respect to the market maker improves.
The reason for the result in Corollary 6.1 is that if private
information is very precise relative to public information, and there is
a further increase in t £ , then the correlation between the demands
submitted by insiders increases notably. In fact, insiders use more
heavily their private information that was already very precise. This
means that there is less trade crossed among insiders, because private
signals cannot differ too much. This in turn implies less noise in the
order flow as a signal of v and, therefore the market maker is able to 
N
E  *n
predict more accurately —  , that is the sufficient statistic of all 
private information. Thus, this negative effect on the price rule 
outweighs the initial positive effect of more private information.
Note that if N  < 3, expected profits are always increasing in 
Tg . When insiders do not face too much competition, they are always 
better off by being better informed.
It is interesting to measure the amount of private information 
that is publicly revealed through the price system in this economy.
Kyle (1985) proposed as a measure of how much private information is 
revealed by prices the difference between the prior precision of v and 
the posterior precision of v conditional on prices. In our model with 
public information the right measure would be
R = jvar(v|p, sQ)j -  |Var(v|io)J
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When public signals are available, the variance of the prior 
is in fact Var(v|sQ). To empirically interpret this measure note that, 
after v is observed, we car run two regressions. One regression would 
be of v against sq alone, and the other one of v against both p and s q. 
The residual variances of these regressions are Var(v|so ) and 
Var(v|p, sq ) respectively. The difference between this magnitudes will 
give us the reduction on the prior variance due to the private 
information incorporated on prices.
It can be proved that
Var(v|p, s ) = ----------- ----- v---------
Var(v|s )
Like Var(p), this magnitude is independent of «r because 
insiders trade more aggressively when there is more liquidity trading 
providing camouflage. This implies that the informative content of the 
• order flow remains constant. Note that R is increasing in both and
N. Either more private information or more insiders increase the
44
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informational content of both order flows and prices13.
Moreover, R is increasing in t q. As we have seen in Section
3, insiders reveal more of their private information through the order
flow when the market maker is able to observe both w  and s .o
An interesting exercise suggested by Kyle (1986) consists of 
fixing the total amount of private information, given by M  = Nx^, and
to increase the number of agents. This means that there are more
informed agents in the market but each of them owns a  more imprecise 
signal now. The total amount of information is split equally among the 
N  agents. Take the limit when N  co and keep M constant, to obtain
lim R = |
Nx =N e
In other words, prices do not reveal more than half of the 
total private information. The weight of each individual becomes small 
with respect to the whole market and each agent knows very little about 
v (t£ becomes small). However, informed agents use their private 
information in such a way that never the market maker can learn more 
than half of the total private information.
I will show in Section 11 how this result is also true in 
a model in which prices Eire selected according to market clearing rules.
Another interesting result is that if we keep the number of 
insiders constant and assume that private information becomes perfect
13 The fact that lim R = co is similar to the results in Milgrom 
(1979).
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(re -» oo), prices do not become fully revealing either, 
lim R = N (t + t ) .v 0T -Jooe
This result tells us that the posterior precision is increased 
by N  times the prior precision. In particular I recover Kyle (1985) 
result that says that when there is a single perfectly informed insider 
the posterior precision doubles the prior precision.
7. COMMON PRIVATE INFORMATION.
Until now I have assumed that the private information 
possessed by insiders is diverse. My results about the effects of 
public information do not change substantially if I assume that all 
informed agents receive the same signal s = v + e, where, as before, 
e ~ W(0, 1/tg ). Keeping unchanged the structure of all other random 
variables and the sequence of events, I can state the following 
proposition:
PROPOSITION 7.1: The unique linear symmetric equilibrium with common
private information is given by the following demand for each agent:
x  = x(s, s ) = a +/3 s + k s , n o o
and the pricing rule
p = p(w, s q) = 6* + A* w  + y* s q ,
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where
(N + 1)(t + t ) 2I— !— + - i - |
Z T + T T ̂v O E J-
Proof: The proof mimics the one in Proposition 2.2. The only
difference is that I have to replace EC/3 £  s \s ) in the proof of
J*n J n
Proposition 2.2 by (3[N-l)s. The details are left to the reader.
From the equilibrium values given in Proposition 7.1, compute 
both the informed traders’ expected profits E*(7rn) and the liquidity 
traders’ expected profits E (rt1),
47
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E*(7!n) = e|\v - p(w, sQ)).xJis, SQ)j =
= 1___
(W + 1)(t  + T )v 0
(7.2)
It is easy to see that E (rcn) is decreasing in tq and E (n ) 
is increasing in t q. The reason for this is the same that for the case 
of diverse information: the market becomes more liquid and the insiders
lose their informational advantage.
However, the result I obtained in the previous section 
referred to the value of private information is totally changed when 
private information is common. In this case,insiders’ expected profits 
Eire always increasing in t £ . More private information means that 
informed agents as a group improve their position with respect to the 
market maker. However, private information does not exhibit any 
externality now.
When private information was diverse, higher levels of private 
information, parameterized by re> might result in lower expected profits 
earned by the insiders. The market maker might be able to predict more 
accurately v after observing the order flow w. The reason for obtaining 
that result does not apply in the common information setup. Given that 
all the insiders receive the same information and submit the same net
48
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demand, it is not true now that the demands become more correlated.
This would imply more precise inferences made by the price setter.
I proceed to analyze the implications for volume of trade done 
by the market maker and price volatility. From the discussion in 
Section 4, the standard deviation of the order flow is the relevant 
measure for the expected volume of trade done by the market maker. It 
can be shown that
EC71) = E[j I xn(5, + £|j =
l _________________________________| l
= ^ Var + + + 0-2 = °"z ^ 1/2 + •
The expected volume of trade done by the market maker is 
independent of the level of public information. Here, more public 
information does not reduce the occurrence of "unmatched" demands 
because all insiders receive the same private information. This implies 
that there is no trading crossed among insiders and all their demands 
have to be met by the market maker.
If we allow for liquidity discretionary traders in this common 
private information setup, then an increase in t q that attracts those 
discretionary traders will always mean higher expected volume of trade 
because there will be more noise trading and also more insider trading.
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Finally I can compute the variance of the price as a measure 
of volatility. It can be proved that
that is an increasing function of x q as for the case with diverse 
information. Again, the price selected by the market maker tends to 
adjust the true realization of v when there is more public information 
available.
8. A  MONOPOLISTIC MARKET FOR INFORMATION.
In this section I analyze the performance of a monopolistic 
market for information in the spirit of Admati and Pfleiderer (1986, 
1988b). There is a risk neutral monopolist in this market who is able 
to produce information and has two options: a) To use the information by 
himself and trade actively in the market for the risky asset, or b) To 
sell the information to others.
If the monopolist chooses option b, then he has to select the 
number of agents to whom is going to sell the information, the precision 
of this information and, finally, its price. In order to simplify the 
analysis I assume that information garbling is not allowed. I am also 
going to assume that the information owned by the informed agent is 
verifiable by the potential buyer. Thus, I abstract from the 
reliability problems analyzed for instance in Allen (1987a).
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I proceed to describe the technology that produces
information. The monopolist may produce signals of the asset return v
at unitary cost C' > 0. Each signal takes the form s^ = v + e^ where
nd variance -  for all r
Therefore, if the monopolist produces J signals, then the unbiased and 
most efficient estimate about v is
J j
I  5 Z  Sj
s - ̂ = 1 V + ■i = 1
?! ^Define e = — j--- , and it follows that the precision Tg of c
is equal to Jr. Finally, it is clear that the cost of producing an
estimate with precision t + t is ct where c = -'.
v C C T
Therefore, I have shown that the problem of selecting a level 
of precision for the estimate of v is equivalent to the one of selecting 
the number J of observations.
As I have also said, if the monopolist chooses to sell his 
information he has to choose the number of buyers to whom he will sell 
it, the level of precision he will produce and the price of that 
information.
The latter variable can be determined in a straightforward 
way. Given our monopolistic setup, we can assume that the monopolist 
extracts all the surplus from the buyers. This means that the price 
p (N, of a signal with noise precision sold to N  buyers is equal 
to the certainty equivalent of the profits per capita when there are N 
informed agents who trade using the same signal with noise precisions
51
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equal to T£ . From risk neutrality and from (7.1), we can conclude that
P <*• V  (J, + 1)(T + T ) ' >1 j \ - MT + T T■ t v  o e J
Therefore, the maximization problem faced by the monopolist
Max n(.N, z ) = p (N, t  ) • N  -  ex subject to N  s N 
t , N e e
where N  is the number of potential buyers. I assume that N  £ 1.
LEMMA 8.1: The optimal values (N , p ) for the monopolist’s
maximization problem are
Proof: After differentiating n{N, r^) with respect to N and
simplifying, we obtain
52
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Then, n[N, x£ ) is strictly increasing (decreasing)
iff N  < 1 (W > 1). Therefore, for any value of N* = 1 is the value
of N  that maximizes n(.N, x ).e
Differentiate n(N, x ) with respect to x and make N  = 1, to e e
obtain (8.2).
To see that the optimal value t e defined implicitly in (8.2)
is unique and belongs to the open interval (0, oo), note that the right
hand side of (8.2) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of
t  that I denote F(x ). It can be checked that lim F(r ) = 0 and c e c
Te-*°
lim F(x ) = oo. Then, continuity of F( •) proves the existence of
t e
e (0, co). Uniqueness follows from strict monotonicity of F ( •).
I obtain the optimal value of p replacing in (8.1) N and xe 
by their optimal values. ■
Lemma 8.1 tells us that if the monopolist chooses to sell 
information, then he wants to sell it to a single buyer. This buyer 
will be able to extract the maximum surplus from the financial market. 
This single trader will have to worry only about competing with the 
market maker and not with other informed traders. This result resembles 
the one in the theory of oligopolistic competition that says that the 
sum of profits obtained by oligopolistic firms operating in a market is
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lower than the profits obtained by a monopolistic firm operating in the 
same market. Obviously, the risk neutral monopolist is indifferent 
between selling his information to a single agent extracting all the 
surplus or using the information by himself.
An obvious comparative statics result I get from (8.2), after 
implicitly differentiating, is that the equilibrium private precision x£ 
is decreasing in the unitary cost c of producing it.
Now, I am in a position to analyze the effects of public 
information on the incentives to produce private information.
Basically, I want to study how t£ responds to changes in xQ. The answer 
is given in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 8.2: There exists a c > 0  such that the optimal value of
re in the monopolist problem is increasing in x q if and only if the 
unitary cost of producing private information is less them c .
Proof: Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (8.2), it can shown
that
8t A t ) 1/3 4/3 r
4a1/3 7 7 ™
dr* >
It follows that < 0 if and only if a < 2. Notice that for 
o
given and xQ, the optimal private precision xg (c) is strictly
decreasing in c and tends to zero (infinite) when c tends to
infinite (zero). Therefore, define c* implicitly as x*(c*) = 2(x + x )
and the result follows. ■
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This proposition tells us that when the production of 
information is very costly, the direct negative effect of increasing 
public information, as a consequence of Corollary 3.1, is never overcome 
by means of producing more private information. However, when c is low 
enough, the insider wants to produce still more private information in 
order to maintain his relative advantage with respect to the market 
maker.
Figure 1 illustrates the previous discussion. In this figure
the information costs c are ranked as follows: c < c < c . When c 1 1 2  3 1
is lower, the optimal demand for information is more likely to be 
increasing in t q.
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE)
This result contrasts with the results in Verrecchia (1982) 
and Gonedes (1980) for perfectly competitive economies with risk averse 
agents. These authors claimed that additional public disclosures 
motivates the agents to cut back the production of information.
However, when the strategic relationship between the informed agent and 
the market maker is taken into account, the effects on the production of 
private information depend on the cost of produce it.
Another question posed by Gonedes (1980) is: How does public
disclosure affect the total level of informedness of the trader?. The 
overall level t  of a trader’s informedness can be defined as the sum of 
precisions of prior, public and private information, i.e.,
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The following corollary gives the comparative statics result:
COROLLARY 8.3: The overall level of the trader’s informedness is
increasing in t q.
Proof: Compute the derivative of x with respect to x q.
-A ("O Oo1/3 „4/3 -,4/3 2/3 ^ r,J/3
1/3 2/3
Public information increases the trader’s informedness despite 
the fact that it may reduce the amount of private information produced. 
This result is similar to the one in Verrecchia (1982).
Finally, let us observe that more public information decreases 
always the informed agent’s welfare even if this agent can react 
changing the level of private information he produces. This result 
follows from an application of the Envelope Theorem to the optimal 
profits function when the level of public information is x ,
and obviously
8u It , t (x )
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9. ASSOCIATIONS OF INVESTORS.
The results in Section 8 give us an immediate Corollary about 
the desirability of associations or syndicates of investors from the 
point of view of the informed traders14.
I consider two types of associations: 1) Associations in which 
its members precommit before receiving their signal to share their 
private information. Afterwards, agents will compete in the financial 
market using a more precise common information, and 2) Associations in 
which informed traders not only share their information but the 
association submits a collective demand to the market maker based upon 
all the information collected by its members. Profits will be 
distributed equally among members of the association.
Let us assume that each agent owns a private signal s
(n = 1 N) about v with the statistical properties of Section 2. The
total private informedness in the economy is Nt ^ (the sum of precisions 
of private signals). Denote tiJ(W, xc ), j = n, s, as the expected 
profits of informed agents when there are N informed agents, each of 
them receiving a signal with precision rg . The superindex j can take 
the values n or s depending on whether the private information is 
diverse (Section 2) or common (Section 7) respectively. n n (N, r£ ) is 
given in (3.1) and ns(N, t£ ) is given in (7.1).
The desirability of associations of type 1 depends on the
The implementation of associations of investors as the 
equilibrium of an information transmission game (as in Gal-Or (1985)) 
takes us beyond the scope of this paper.
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relation between the magnitudes of ti" = n (N , Tg ) and the expected 
profits 7rs = ns(N, Nx^) when the N  informed agents share a more precise 
common information.
On the other hand, to analyze the desirability of associations 
of investors in which the demand is submitted collectively (type 2), we 
have to compute the profits "per capita" nA = i [ti(1, N*C D  obtained 
through the association. When N = 1 the superindex is redundant.
From Lemma 8.1, we know that tts < 7iA. In fact, Lemma 8.1 says
that
Nns = Nns(N, Nx ) <  nil, Nx ) = NnA for N  > 1 ,£ £
and thus n < n . This confirms our intuition that collusive behavior 
delivers higher profits per capita than competition. The following 
corollary compare this two magnitudes with nn.
COROLLARY 9.1: rrs < jrn < /
Proof: 1) ?rn < 7rA. Divide 7in by irA and obtain
|l + (N + l)a + Na2]2
R(a) ;
1 + N  + 1 1 + — 2 “  '
where a is defined in (8.4). It can be proved that the derivative of
R(.) with respect to a is strictly negative whenever N > 1. It can be
?W1/2proved that lim R(a) = 1 and lim R(a) = < 1, for N  > 1.
a-*0 a-*» N + 1
Therefore, 7rn < 7iA for all values of a < co and N  > 1.
2) ns < 7rn. Similarly, compute R  (a) = —  and obtain
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1 , 1  I- 1 + Na* + (N + l)a •>
where R (a) has an strictly positive derivative with respect to a,
• lim R (a) = 1, and lim R*(.a) = ‘j? . < 1 for N > 1. Therefore, nB < 
a-*a a-tf N 1
for all values of a < n and N > 1.
To interpret Corollary 9.1, note that the configuration 
associated with jrA is a monopolistic one in which the association is not 
facing competition and has also more information than the private agents 
separately. Therefore rcA > 7in is the logical result.
A little bit more surprising is that nn > ns, i.e., that 
information pooling and competing delivers lower expected profits than 
competing without information sharing. The reason is that when all 
agents make trades based on the same information, the order flow is more 
informationally "pure" in the sense of having less noise due to the 
existence of diverse signals (possibly in opposite directions). The 
existence of this diverse information makes difficult for the market
N
? -maker to predict 1 ̂  n, the sufficient estimate of all private
information available in the economy.
To see that this is the case, consider the informational 
content of the order flow, as defined in the expression (A.9) of the
Appendix. We have to compare with t ", where the superindexes have
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the same meaning as before15. It is easy to see that
N + 1 
Nx
and it is clear that x > x iff N  > 1. Even if each agent owns better 
information, informed agents as a  whole lose ground with respect to 
the market maker.
Finally, let us point out that the optimality properties of 
syndicates of investors from the point of view of informed agents are 
qualitatively independent of the precision of public information; in 
fact they are independent of a.
10. A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION.
10. A. The Model.
I introduce a different mechanism of price formation in this 
section. This mechanism resembles the one used in the traditional 
models of noisy rational expectations. The equilibrium prices will be 
formed by automatic market clearing and the quantities demanded by
x is the precision of the random variable u such that
• No. - Nic £
N(2 N(3
are defined in Proposition 7.1.
E  en
Here, e = —  and a , 0 , k
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informed agents will be conditional on prices (limit orders). Section 
11 will perform the comparative statics of this model in order to see 
how robust are the results obtained in previous sections under a 
different mechanism of price formation.
When agents are allowed to submit limit orders, the 
information sharing among informed agents is increased notably. Since 
insiders are now able to condition their demands on prices, they are 
able to infer part of others’ information from the prices at which the 
transactions are carried out.
The structure of the model I propose is based on Kyle (1986)
and Jackson (1988) whose work is in turn based on Grossman (1981b) and
Wilson (1979) respectively.
Each informed agent receives again a piece of private 
information and a public signal sq. I assume that both private and
public signals are received at no cost and I will maintain this
assumption throughout my remaining analysis16. The statistical 
properties of these signals and all other random variables are exactly 
the same as in the market orders model.
After observing these signals, informed agents select a 
continuous demand function17, i.e., a function that specifies for each 
price the number of shares that they are willing to buy.
16 The model of this section can be viewed as the imperfectly 
competitive version of the model in Grossman (1976).
17 The space of actions can be enlarged to allow for upper 
hemicontinuous, convex-valued and real-valued correspondences. See Kyle 
(1986) for a specification of a pricing rule defined in this actions 
space.
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Let us denote X as the strategy of agent n. The strategy X  
is a map from IR2 (the cartesian product of private and public signals) 
into the set of functions from !R (prices) to IR (quantities). Therefore, 
X^(•; s , sq) is a random variable that takes values in the set of 
continuous functions. X^( •; s^, s q ) is a particular demand function 
corresponding to the particular combination (s^, s q ) of private and 
public signals, x^ = x^ip, s^, s q) = X^p; s^, s q) denotes the quantity 
of asset bought by an agent, given a particular realization of s^, sq 
and the price p (I will show below v/hy prices are random variables). In 
other words, x is the realization of the random variable 
xn = XJ-P> ®n» sQ) = ^n> 50)-
There is also a source of noise z that is independent of s q,
s (n = 1 N ) and p. This random variable z CEin be justified in the
same way as in the previous model.
I proceed to define the pricing rule. Prices are formed 
according to an automatic "market clearing" rule. I assume that there 
is a computerized system that receives all the limit orders plus noise.
The observed aggregate net demand is defined by
N
D(p) = Y. x jp, sn> SQ) + z .
Define the set of equilibrium prices 
E = jp € IR |D(p) = oj- .
If E = 0 , the computer-auctioneer shuts down the market. This 
means that trade is not allowed. In this case, x = 0 (n = and
liquidity traders cannot sell or buy any share. Strategic agents will
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make zero expected profits in this case .
If E * 0 , the equilibrium price p is selected according to
p = argmin |p| . 
p 6 E
The previous equation defines the random variable p 
implicitly. However, given the restrictions I will impose in the next 
section, I will be able to give an explicit formula for that random
variable. Note that p is (z, sq, s ,̂ .. . , -measurable but is not
(s q, si>... s n)-measurable, i.e, p is not a sufficient estimate for all 
information available in the economy.
It is also important to note that p is a function of all the
strategies used by informed agents. Therefore, I can write
The expected profits for the informed agent N, after 
observing and s q are
E [""(xa V l sn > so) = E{ (? " V  So)|sn,soj .
The Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of this game is defined as the 
set of strategies X  X such that,
This is a situation that will never occur in equilibrium. 
However, this contingency has to be characterized in order to have i 
well defined extensive form of the game.
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E(" " < V -'V -'< ) l!v  so] a %)■
' n = 1, ,N, for al1 X , and for al 1 s and s .n n o
This equilibrium is called a rational expectation equilibrium 
with imperfect competition (REEIC).
It is worth to highlight the difference with the traditional 
rational expectations equilibrium with perfect competition (REEPC) in 
which prices are also selected according to a market clearing rule. In 
the REEPC, each agent is "price taker": he considers that he cannot 
affect the equilibrium price. This leads in our economy with a  finite 
number agents to "schizophrenic behavior" according to Hellwig (1980). 
Each agent recognizes how the price is formed and that his behavior has 
a nonnegligible effect on prices but he does not try to manipulate the 
mechanism of price formation. There is a solution to this conceptual 
difficulty in Hellwig (1980), for the single security case, and in 
Admati (1985), for the case of several securities. Both authors 
consider a large market in which each individual agent does not affect 
the equilibrium price because he has measure zero with respect to the 
total mass of agents in the economy.
The concept of rational expectation equilibrium with imperfect 
competition gives a different solution to the "schizophrenia" problem.
We still have a finite number of agents who realize that they have an 
effect on prices and, therefore, they act strategically. Applying the 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept to a game with demand schedules as 
■ actions, we get an equilibrium concept that collects all the strategic 
interactions between agents and the process of price formation.
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Note also that this model of competition based on a game of 
demand schedules submission gives a little bit more of sense to the 
rational expectations equilibrium as described for instance in Grossman 
(1981a). There was in that description a problem of circularity because 
an agents’ demand depends on the equilibrium price, and this price 
depends simultaneously on that demand. This circularity disappears in 
the demand schedules submission game in which the sequence of events is 
perfectly structured.
10. B. Equilibrium.
For reasons of tractability, I am going to restrict the space of 
demand schedules to the space of linear demand functions. A strategy X 
for agent n is a mapping from the space IR2 of signals to the space L of 
linear demand functions
Xn: [R2  > L
(S^, SQ) I-------» \ ^ Sn’ S0^ + Cn^Sn’ S<?' P
Furthermore, I assume that
j4 (s , s ) = a + $ s + k s n n O  n n n n O
and cJ-sn' s0) = An» for (sn> s0) e r2
I will restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, i.e.,
. «n = a, A = At k  = k  and A = A for’ all n.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PROPOSITION 10.1: When N > 2, there exists a unique symmetric and
linear rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect competition. 
This equilibrium is given by
x = a + $s + k s  -  ftp ,
N(N -  2)<r 12 2t v
N2
(N - 2) o- t "12
- 2)o-^ ")2 2t q
(W -  1)t I W2
W(W -  2)0-^ "]2 2(t + t ) + Wt
Proof: See the Appendix.
The requirement of N > 2 is similar to the one in the theory 
of Cournot competition. There, the equilibrium fails to exist if the 
demand is infinitely elastic. Here, liquidity traders have an
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infinitely elastic demand and having more than two informed agents 
suffices to have bounded demands for the insiders.
From the equilibrium given in Proposition 10.1, and since 
the equilibrium price is
N
Na. + $ Yi + + 2
p = --------------   , (10.1)
Wp
it is easy to check that E(p) = v. It can also be proved that 
E ^ C p ,  sn, sQ)j = 0.
Recall that the depth of the market is the inverse of the 
induced change on prices when the order flow increases one unit. From 
(10.1), it is obvious that the depth of the market is equal to Wp. 
Looking at the equilibrium value of p in Proposition 10.1., it is also 
obvious that the depth of the market is increasing in t q.
In this REEIC model there is no market maker who makes 
inferences from order flows and, therefore, the argument to explain why 
the price is less sensitive to quantities should be modified 
accordingly.
When more precise public information is available, the 
"expected" individual demand schedules become more elastic. Note that 
the expected intercept of the equilibrium demand schedules with the 
"quantities axis" is J(tq) = E(a + $sn + k s q ) = a + ($ + k)v, that is 
clearly increasing in tq (for v > 0). This is because agents put more 
weight on public signals. For v < 0 the argument is symmetric. Since 
the expected equilibrium price is equal to v, the expected individual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
equilibrium demand schedule has to shift as in figure 2 when t q 
increases.
(INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE)
Individual demand functions will become more elastic, and this 
means that both p and Nfl (the inverse of the slope of aggregate demand 
in figure 2) increase. Higher values of imply in turn that if there 
is a shock in the "quantities axis" in figure 2 due to liquidity 
trading, then the "reflected shock" on the "prices axis" is more 
attenuated.
11. COMPARATIVE STATICS OF THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS WITH 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION MODEL.
In this section I apply the analysis of sections 3, 4 and 6 to 
the model developed in the previous section.
The discussion at the end of Section 10 implies our first
Corollary.
COROLLARY 11.1: The expected profits of informed agents are decreasing
in t q and the opposite is true for the expected profits of liquidity 
traders.
Proof: For the strategic traders compute
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Use (10.1) and the equilibrium values of a, $, k , and /j in Proposition 
10.1, to obtain
N(N -  2)x
2
which is clearly decreasing in t q.
For liquidity traders, compute
ECrc1) = E^(v - p)-z. j = E ^  z^j
that is equal to
,/a t . _ I NiN - 1)E ( n )
«r U  - 2)x I (t
which is increasing in x .
Once I have proved that more public information implies a 
deeper market, the effects on expected profits are justified as in 
Section 3: there is a transfer of expected profits from insiders to 
liquidity traders.
Other implications of the model with market orders and price 
selected by market makers can be recovered in this model of limit orders 
and price selected by automatic market clearing. For instance, I can 
compute the variance of prices in the
69
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REEIC model and obtain
N(.2N -  3)t t ___________ e v
Var(p) = 'o
2(r^ + t q ) + 12'e
and it can be proved that dVar(p) > 0 as in the case of market orders.
When the precision of public information increases, insiders are more 
sensitive to the realization of the public signal. This means that there 
is more volatility in the intercept of the demand function with the 
"quantities axis" (see figure 2). This increased volatility in this 
axis overcomes the fact that the demand function has less slope.
of public disclosure when there are risk-averse original stockholders 
that want to cancel their position in the firm, applies also in the 
present model.
the value of private information for the informed agents, whose proof is 
immediate.
COROLLARY 11.2: Expected profits of informed agents are decreasing in
we have seen in section 6. After some level of overall private 
information, additional private information makes insiders worse off. 
The intuition behind this result is that when private information is
The discussion and the results in Section 4 about desirability
Finally, I obtain again the following ambiguous result about
Private information exhibits the same decreasing returns that
70
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very precise, agents put still more weight on their own private signals 
and then, the expected intercept on the quantities axis of the 
equilibrium individual demand schedules becomes increasing in xg . This 
means a flatter demand schedule (p increases), which implies a deeper 
market. As I have argued, more depth results in a transfer of expected 
profits from insiders to liquidity traders. On the other hand, when the 
precision of private signals is very low, an increase on that precision 
results in more willingness to share information among insiders. The 
way of increasing information sharing among informed agents consists of 
steeper demands. This implies a greater sensitivity of the equilibrium 
price to private information.
The amount of private information revealed exclusively by 
prices, parameterized by
R = |var(v|p, sQ)j - |Var(v|so)J
is now
N(N -  2)r 
^ = 2N~—~3~~ .
Note that even if the number of agents goes to infinite 
keeping constant the aggregate precision M  = Nx^ of private information 
and dividing this total information equally among insiders, we get
lim R = |
N-*o d »
Nxe= M
that is the same result that I obtained in section 6.
As Kyle (1986) argues, this limit REEIC model looks like a
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monopolistic competition model. Even if agents know very little about v 
(tc becomes small as N  increases) and the size of each agent becomes 
negligible, traders always face a residual supply curve with non-zero 
slope I -- - -  < ol. This induces them to restrict their trade and
(W -  l)/i J
to use their private information in such a way that no more than half of 
total private information is revealed by prices.
A difference with the market orders model appears when we fix 
the number of insiders and compute the limit of R when goes to 
infinite. This limit is equal to infinite. Since private information 
is perfect, if the insiders can submit demand schedules, then they are 
able in fact to observe the information received by the other agents
(s = v, n = 1 N). Moreover, they observe the realization of z
through the equilibrium price. This means that all uncertainty vanishes 
from the point of view of insiders and then, given risk neutrality, the 
aggregate demand schedule becomes flat. Depending on whether v >(<) p, 
the demand for assets is + oo (—  co). This means that the only 
equilibrium price that clears the market is p = v and prices become 
fully revealing.
From the previous paragraph it is obvious that, in a model 
with common private information, prices fully reveal all private 
information. In this case, the unique equilibrium price is such that 
p = s = s for n = 1 N.
72
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12. A  COMPARISON RESULT
I have studied two mechanisms of price formation. These two 
mechanisms are the most popular in the finance literature and it seems 
natural to ask which mechanism is more efficient. The answer to this 
question is always ambiguous, because, as I have explained throughout 
the paper, what is good for liquidity traders is bad for insiders.
The result of the comparison follows from the discussion about 
the value of private information. Too much private information is 
harmful for informed agents in both models of price formation. As I 
have said, the limit orders model involves more information sharing than 
the market orders model because the equilibrium price reveals others’ 
private information. Therefore, when private information is very 
precise, the participants in a regime with limit orders and automatic 
market clearing would prefer to switch to a regime with market orders in 
which there is no information sharing and all agents become less 
informed. The converse argument applies when T£ is low.
The following Proposition confirms the previous intuitive
argument.
PROPOSITION 12.1: For N  > 2, there exists a t * s (0, co) such thate
ECti") * E(rtn) iff t I t* .< e < e
Proof: Using the expressions for insiders’ expected profits in both
regimes given in (3.1) and (11.1), compute their ratio and simplify to 
obtain
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= J l — f  fl * - i _ l
(1 + a) J [ 2 + Na J ,
E(7l) 
Q(a) = -----  :
E(7Tn)
where, again, a = -— + ^ , It can be proved that -~g—  < 0 when N  > 2.
v o l
[N  — l l  2t > 1 and limQ(a) = 0. Therefore, by continuity ^  a-*»
of (?(•), there exists an a e (0, co) such that Q(a ) = 1. Then, 
t£ = a (x^ + tq) is the desired threshold that equates both expected 
profits. ■
Note that, when public information is very precise, a tends to
zero and the mechanism with limit orders and market clearing is more
efficient. However, when public information becomes very imprecise a
tends to ^ / x  and the relative efficiency of each mechanism will depend
on whether is greater or smaller than a**x .
Again, the results are reversed for liquidity traders’
expected profits. Thus, our results indicate that if legislators only
care about liquidity traders, i.e., uninformed agents that participate
in financial markets in order to make intertemporal transfers of
wealth exclusively, then it is optimal to force as much public disclosure
of information as possible. Once the level of public information x* is
determined the optimal mechanism of trading will depend on the value of
a = x£/(xv + x q). When z is not associated with liquidity traders the
results indicate that public information should be forbidden (x = 0)o
and the optimal mechanism should be selected depending on the value of
a = x /x . e v
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13. CONCLUSION
We have studied the effects of public information in two 
contexts and we have proved that more public information dissipates the 
informational advantage of informed agents and improves the position of 
liquidity traders.
Legislation on public disclosure tends to protect liquidity 
traders. As I have shown, more public information increases the 
expected profits earned by liquidity traders (in fact, what public 
information does is to reduce the cost of trading for these agents).
This result is obtained in both regimes of price formation: a regime
with competitive market makers and a regime with automatic market 
clearing.
If we assume that the noise z is not associated with liquidity 
trading, but with random supply of risky asset or with some noise in the 
communication process, then the disclosure of public information 
decreases the welfare of all active participants in the market.
These results are modified in the market orders model either 
when private information is costly or when disclosure requirements are 
not uniform across firms and we allow for discretionary liquidity 
traders who choose in which market they will trade. In the later case, 
both informed and liquidity traders may benefit from disclosure of 
public information in their own market at the expense of traders in the 
market in which the discretionary liquidity trading was previously
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
concentrated.
I have shown that in general more public information means 
greater price volatility (in both regimes) and lower expected volume of 
trade done by the market maker provided that private information is 
diverse. On the other hand, the relative efficiency of associations of 
investors is independent of the precision of public information. With 
respect to the incentives to produce private information, I have shown 
that the results are ambiguous depending on the unitary cost of 
producing such private information. Finally, the relative efficiency of 
the two mechanisms of price formation depends on the precision of both 
public and private information.
Our model has obvious limitations and, therefore, it has room 
for extensions. The most important limitation comes from the assumption 
of risk neutrality. This assumption allows us tractability but prevent 
us from studying the effects of public information on the risky position 
of each agent and on the risk sharing among participants in the market. 
It can be easily proved that, with CARA utility functions, the linear 
equilibrium involves the solution to a fifth-order polynomial. This 
implies that, if we wanted to model risk aversion, we should confine our 
analysis to numerical examples. However, the equilibria obtained in the 
two models of price formation analyzed in this paper are the ones 
corresponding to limit equilibria of economies with risk averse agents 
whose coefficient of risk aversion tends to zero. Continuity is not 
lost in the limit, given our strategic behavior assumption. This is in 
stark contrast with the traditional models of rational expectations with 
perfect competition, this means that our results Eire still applicable
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to markets with mutual funds or insurance companies that hold a very 
diversified portfolio and that have a very large risk bearing capacity, 
given the large number of individuals that represent.
Given the difficulty of modeling explicitly risk aversion in 
this imperfectly competitive setup (at least with our distributional 
assumptions), I think that there are two more promising topics that 
should be explored in order to put the models of imperfect competition 
in financial markets at the same level as the ones of perfect 
competition. The first one refers to the extension of the model to a 
multi-security world as Admati (1985) did in a  perfectly competitive 
setup. This extension would allows us to characterize the behavior of 
insiders in several markets who manipulate one market in order to send 
misleading signals to other markets.
The second line of research involves a more general analysis 
of the information acquisition problem. I have studied in this paper 
the incentives that a monopolistic insider has to produce information. 
The obvious extension should be to allow for several endogenously 
informed agents. In that model we should specify a two-stage game. In 
the first stage, the insiders would select the amount of information 
they will produce and, in the second stage, they will compete using that 
information. Verrecchia (1982a, 1982b) has studied this problem for the 
competitive case. Matthews (1984) has some results for auctions with 
prices as strategic variables and finite number of agents.
Finally, I should point out that our paper has several 
empirical implications on volume of trade, price volatility and 
informational content of prices. Therefore, future research should also
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
involve some empirical tests applied to thin financial markets in order 
to assess the power of the models developed in this paper.
7S
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Proof of Proposition 2.2: Suppose that each informed agent makes the
conjecture that the others’ demand will take the form
Xj = a + 13sj + k s q , (A. 1)
and the pricing rule will be linear
p = 5 + Xw + ?so . (A.2)
The total order flow as conjectured by agent n will be
w = (tf-l)a + 13 V s + (W-I)ks + x + z -
j i i j 0 n
= (W-l)a + IN-l)(3v + 13 £  e + U-l)»cs + x + z .
j^n O n
conditional on the signals he has received. These profits are given by 
E(Tin |sn,so) = E^(v - p ) x J s n,soj = E^(v - 8 - Aw - 2rso) x J s n, =
= - 5 - A^(W-l)a+CW-l)|3v +|3 J) ej+(W-l)Kso+Xn+zj- sQj .
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The first order condition of this maximization problem is
£l- (JV-l)A/3jE(u|sn>so) -J(W-l)AK+yjso-5-(iV-l)Aa
x = --------------------------------------------------------- , (A
n 2A
and the second order condition is
-  2A < 0 ,i.e., A > 0 . (A
The expected payoff conditional on both private and public 
signal can be computed using Lemma 2.1.,
E(v|s , s )  = -
Plugging (A.5) into (A.3) and using (A.1) to equate coefficients, we 
obtain the following equations:
[l - (W-l)A/3jrv v
- S - (JV-l)AaT + T + T
1 - (JV-DA/3 T
T + T + T
1̂1 - (W-1)A/3Jt q
- - (W-l)A(C - yT + T + T
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On the other hand, the zero profit condition for the market 
maker implies
p = E(v|v, s q ) .
Notice that to observe s q and v is informationally equivalent 
to observe s q and the following random variable:
N
w - Net - Nk s  J  e z
Thus, it can be shown that the precision of the random 
N
£  S ;
variable u = ------  +-----
N  N(S
N 2 |32
Using again Lemma 2.1,
w - Not - Nks
W  j
E(v|so,v) = ------------ T + T + T------------  = 5 + \w + yso . (A10)
Therefore, equating coefficients, after plugging (A.9) into (A.10), we
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obtain the following equations:
m  + <r t
T + T + -
In equilibrium, the conjectures of all agents must be 
fulfilled. Therefore, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game is 
given by the values of (a, 0, k, 5, X, y) that solve simultaneously 
equations (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13).
To solve this nonlinear system of equations, first solve the 
subsystem consisting of (A.7) and (A.12) which only contains A and 0 as 
unknowns. In the third-order polynomial equation that appears, I select 
the unique root consistent with the second order condition (A.4). 
Finally, plug the solutions for X and 0 in the remaining equations to
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obtain the solution written in the statement of the proposition.
The details and the messy algebra necessary to get 
this solution are left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 10.1: The market clearing condition,
according to our conjectured linearity, takes the form 
N
N& + $ Y, sn + ~  NPP + z = 0 .
This implies that the equilibrium price for each realization 
of z, s s (n = 1 N) is
Not + $ £  s n + ^ s0 + z
P = --------— —  --------------- . (A. 1'
Np
Since each informed trader considers the others’ strategies : 
given, he is facing the following residual demand:
(tf - l)a + 0 £  s + (W -  1)k s  + z 
 J*n n______________°
U  - l)p (W -  1)m
Therefore, strategic agents solve the following maximization
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max E^(v -  pjxjs^, sq, pj
= max E 
x e IR (N-l)p (W-Dp
The first order condition for this problem is
E(v|s , s , p) ■
(N -  l)p
- E!
\ n  -  i); (.N -  Dies + z
(N - D p
Because of (A.15), (A.16) may be written i
s ,s ,p =0 . (A. 16)
E(v| s , s , p ) -------- - P = 0 ,
" ° (tf-Dp
and this implies,
xn = U  -  l)p[E(v|sn, sQ, p) - pj .
problem is
(A.17)
The second order sufficient condition for the maximization 
- < 0 ,
(w - I)p
that is to say, p must be strictly positive.
Note that to observe the random variables p, s , s is
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informationally equivalent to observe sq, and the following random 
variable:
Npp -  Ncc -  $s -  Nk s
where y  =
(n - m
2  S JJ*n + Z
N -  1 I N  -  1)$
It can be proved that the precision of y is
(N -  l)2 fc2 r
(N -  1)$2 + <r2 r
then, applying Lemma 2.1, I can compute the following expectation:
fNpp - Ncc - $s -  Nk s  "I
E(v|s , s i p) (N -  l)j
Plugging (A.19) into (A.17) and now making the conjecture
xn = Xn^P ’ Sn’ s0  ̂ = “ + ^Sn + KS0 ~ PP ’
and equating coefficients, we obtain the following system:
a = IN - l)ft ( N - l)j
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Using the expression (A.18) for x^, and after some tricky
algebra, it can be proved that the unique solution to the non-linear
system (A.20)-(A.23) that satisfies the second order condition (ft > 0) 
is given by the expressions in the statement of the proposition provided
that N > 2. The strategies characterized by the values of a, 0, k and n
that solve the above system constitute a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of 
the demand schedules submission game. ■
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Figure l - Product, ion of Private Information
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P a r t  2
INSIDER TRADING AND ASSET PRICING IN AN 
IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MULTI-SECURITY MARKET
(with Murugappa Krishnan)
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1. INTRODUCTION
The central purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of 
insider trading (i.e. trading based on private information), in the 
context of an imperfectly competitive multi-security market. Imperfect 
competition allows us to consider strategic behavior, and a 
multi-security market lets us study the effect of a correlated 
environment on equilibrium. A salient feature of our model —  in 
contrast to traditional multi-asset models —  is the manner in which we 
create a link between demands for different securities by the informed. 
Rather than focusing on the incentive to reduce portfolio variance, or 
the effect of short-selling restrictions or budget constraints, we 
employ an informational assumption —  that the market maker can observe 
all order flows, and so, given correlated fundamentals, can potentially 
learn about every security from each order flow. This causes even a 
perfectly informed risk neutral trader who does not face short-selling 
restrictions to refrain from determining the demand for each security 
independently. While this assumption does not exclude the traditional 
ways of generating a link between demands for different securities, a 
basic premise of this paper is that a priori this hypothesis is at least 
as important and interesting, and deserves to be studied independently.
Our principal results include an explicit characterization of 
the unique equilibrium given a linear pricing rule, as a function of 
three general variance-covariance matrices (associated with returns,
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"noise trading" and errors in private signals). Under imperfect 
competition, correlation has two effects. One, ceteris paribus, it 
allows a market maker (or, more generally, the uninformed) to learn from 
additional variables —  order flows in our model. Note, however, that 
each order flow could potentially have information about all returns.
On the other hand, it creates an incentive for, and enables, 
manipulation by an informed trader, who would like to minimize what 
others can learn from public information. It is important to realize 
that a  priori we cannot tell who has more "power", or what kind of 
equilibrium will result, given that both the informed trader and the 
market maker behave strategically. In the context of our model, we 
shall study how these two effects balance each other in equilibrium.
The most striking feature of the model is the extent to which 
strategic behavior can "neutralize" the effect of a correlated 
environment, and distill "joint" effects into "pure" effects. This is 
in sharp contrast to analyses under perfect competition which ignore, by 
definition, the possibility of manipulating inferences and focus only on 
the possibility of learning.
Admati (1985) considers a correlated multi-asset environment, 
as we do in this paper, but under the assumption of perfect competition. 
The main lesson is that it is possible to have a variety of "perverse" 
results (e.g. asset demands may increase in their own prices), by virtue 
of a well-known result in linear statistical inference: the use of
correlated regressors leads to response coefficients that are ambiguous 
in sign (since they generate an "indirect effect" that could swamp the 
"direct effect"). This can sometimes generate "abnormal" predictions
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about terminal values, and also "abnormal" effects on demands and 
prices, since, in a perfect competition rational expectations 
equilibrium (with exponential utility and Gaussian fundamentals), these 
sire just linear functions of such predictions.
While in general such "perverse" possibilities also exist under 
imperfect competition —  since conditional expectations about terminal 
values continue to be a key ingredient —  what is interesting are the 
additional effects that can arise, solely as a consequence of strategic 
behavior. To emphasize that these results are peculiar to imperfect 
competition —  and cannot arise in an Admati (1985) world —  we study 
the case of perfect private information, which eliminates the 
possibility of any correlated-regressors effect. This allows us to 
focus on the impact of "cross-effects" that arise when the informed 
trader tries to "manipulate" the market maker’s strategy, even as the 
market maker tries to "learn" from order flows (which are potentially 
correlated despite perfect private information, because of correlated 
fundamentals). In a Gaussian setting, under completely general 
correlation structures describing returns and liquidity noise, we show 
that strategic behavior is enough to restore various theoretical 
regularities previously associated only with asset pricing models such 
as the CAPM, which did not recognize the existence of private 
information, and allowed only for exogenous, homogeneous beliefs.
Market makers set prices "as if" each price is affected only by its own 
return, and all public information about a security’s return is 
contained in its own price, regardless of the underlying correlation 
structure. The informed trader’s trade off between two incentives —  to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
trade (and derive advantage from private information) and to refrain 
from trading (and so reveal less) —  can however create new reasons for 
"perverse" possibilities, such as asset demands being negative even with 
good news.
We begin by studying the equilibrium in the more general case,
i.e., with imperfect private information, in which we have both the 
correlated-regressors effect and the strategic effect. (To the extent 
that we can allow for perfect private information, on some or all 
assets, our specification is slightly richer than that in Admati (1985), 
for under perfect competition, a rational expectations equilibrium 
cannot even exist with perfect private information. See, e.g., Hellwig 
(1980)). Even in this case, we find that all public information about a 
security’s return is contained in its own price. Also, the relationship 
between prices and returns is always independent of the 
variance-covariance matrix of liquidity noise: the effect of noise
trading is always exactly "balanced" by informed trading. We show that 
restoring predictive content where Admati (1985) found ambiguities is 
valuable for a  class of empirical applications in accounting and 
finance, referred to as "event studies". It helps justify procedures 
originally used in conjunction with the CAPM even in settings 
characterized by the existence of private information.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, 
we introduce our model, and discuss the role of key assumptions. We 
derive the equilibrium in the most general case we consider —  with 
imperfect private information —  in Section 3, and identify some general 
properties in Section 4. To highlight the role of the strategic effect,
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distinct from the correlated-regressors effect referred to above, we 
analyze the case of perfect private information in Section 5, and 
consider a two-asset example in detail in Section 6. Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks.
2. MODEL
The model of a multi-security market that we develop is 
inspired by, and is a generalization of, the single-security model in 
Kyle (1985). It can be regarded as a model of a multi-good auction: 
the price is determined in the last stage of the game1, after traders 
have made their quantity choices. This means that the informed trader 
selects a quantity based on not an actual but an expected price, which 
captures the essence of a setting with "market orders". Of course, in 
equilibrium the trader correctly anticipates the pricing rule (though 
not the actual price) followed by market makers.
Our parametric assumptions are guided in part by Admati (1985) 
who studies a multi-asset market under perfect competition, with a  rich 
correlation structure. Keeping the same correlation structure makes it 
easier to see the impact of strategic behavior.
These models are not, strictly speaking, game-theoretic, for the 
market maker is merely assumed to use a "pricing rule" rather than 
maximize a well-specified objective function. However, as Kyle (1985) 
pointed out, they can easily be made consistent with rigorously defined 
games by assuming Bertrand-type competition among risk-neutral market 
makers.
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Assumptions
A1 There are n securities in the market, which will be indexed by
j, j = 1, 2 yielding a multivariate return vector, 
v = (i^, v~, ...,v~), which is distributed normally with mean vector v 
and a nonsingular variance-covariance matrix
The assumption of nonsingularity is primarily for convenience. 
Extending the analysis to the case of singular distributions does not 
promise any gain in intuition: it involves only technical
considerations adequately dealt with in Admati (1985).
As in Kyle (1985), Hellwig (1980), Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980), etc., we assume that this return distribution is exogenous —  in 
other words, we abstract from moral hazard considerations, which are 
beyond the scope of this paper.
A2 There is a single risk-neutral trader (who faces no
short-selling restrictions) with access to private information about
each security, i.e., this trader observes a vector of signals, s = s,
where s = v + e, with c ~ N(0, Z ). The error distribution is e
independent of the return distribution, but the variance-covariance 
matrix of errors is completely general, and possibly singular, to allow 
for perfect information on some or all assets. The trader’s demands 
will be denoted by a vector x, which is a function of the signal vector 
s.
This assumption is also found in Kyle (1985), and allows a more 
tractable analysis. With several informed traders, we would also have
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to reckon with competition among informed traders, which does not seem 
germane to the theme of this paper, and would only increase analytical 
complexity2. Assuming a single informed trader also captures our belief 
that the strategic interaction between the informed and the uninformed 
is more critical than competition among the informed. We consider the 
almost exclusive focus of public policy on the former effect to be 
indirect evidence consistent with this belief3. Thus, assuming a  single 
informed trader, though literally untrue, nevertheless helps model a 
feature that is plausible on empirical grounds.
A3 There are noise traders who generate a vector of random
"liquidity demands",
z ~ N(z, 2 )
with 2 nonsingular. This is important in providing camouflage for 
informed trading. An alternative way to introduce noise is with 
unobservable preferences, as in Allen (1987) and Ausubel (1988): to do
so we would have to give up risk-neutrality, which is useful in 
maintaining tractability, in a model already overburdened by 
computation.
The reader should consult Caballe (1988) for a  detailed treatment 
of a Kyle market with many informed traders. Besides considering the 
effect of competition among traders under both common and diverse 
information regimes, it also provides results pertaining to entry, with 
or without the possibility of voluntary syndication or pooling.
3 To state this in a slightly different way, public concern centers 
around whether people like Ivan Boesky can —  singly or collectively —  
gain an unfair advantage in their interaction with the uninformed, and 
not around whether they may ruin themselves with competition. Nor is 
public policy complacently assuming that such competition will alleviate 
the disadvantage of the uninformed.
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A4 The price vector p is determined by the following rule:
P = P(v) = E(v|v) (1)
where w = x  + z
Thus, the pricing rule is such that conditional on any set of 
public signals (order flows) market makers can expect to make zero 
profits, in each market. This assumes that we have Bertrand-type 
competition among risk-neutral market makers even before order flows are 
observed (i.e. when pricing strategies, rather than prices, are 
determined), and captures the notion that markets for market making Eire 
"perfectly contestable" (see, e.g. Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1382)), so 
that cross-subsidization is not possible in equilibrium4.
This condition is also important for a technical reason: if we
imposed the weaker requirement that only overall expected profits should 
be zero, we would have to consider pricing rules that are possibly
It is helpful to have in mind a description of the game among 
market makers, to convince oneself that an argument analogous to the 
traditional argument underlying a Bertrand equilibrium is indeed valid. 
Before order flows are determined, market makers decide on "pricing 
rules". A rule promising positive expected profits cannot be an 
equilibrium since it can be "undercut" by an alternative rule that 
yields lower expected profits (which will offer traders more attractive 
terms).
To see that there will be no Incentive to deviate from a 
zero-expected-profits pricing rule, one should note that given rational 
expectations each trader would know every market maker’s pricing rule, 
and can direct orders to any market maker, without revealing her 
identity (by, say, using brokers), and so a  market maker who uses a rule 
that offers a higher price than the zero-expected-profits pricing rule 
will expect to attract the trader only when she wishes to sell; with a 
lower price, only when she wishes to buy —  so a deviation could only 
lead to negative expected profits.
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non-linear in order flows5. This would also result in an objective 
function for the informed trader that is more complex —  in which case 
even the existence of an optimum cannot be taken for granted, and we 
will have to impose additional restrictions.
The assumption that each price is set by an agent who can 
observe all order flows is critical for our analysis. It is not only 
plausible on empirical grounds6, but is also crucial in generating a 
link between demands for different securities. To see this, consider 
what would happen under our other assumptions if the price of a security 
was related only to the order flow of that security. If we have a 
risk-neutral trader with private information about each return, and 
without short-selling restrictions, even if the underlying returns are 
correlated, the informed trader will only be concerned about the sign of 
the net expected return of each security. While this will not lead to 
an infinite position in any security —  for the trader will still reckon 
with the possibility of pushing up the price of that security —  there 
are no "cross-effects" on prices due to order flows, and what we will 
have are simply several "Kyle markets" functioning independently. 
(Correlation among signals will make the trader use all the information
Expected overall profits are given by:
£  tPj - E ( v | w ) ] v
If each such term in the sum is required to be zero, then
Pj = ECvJwj, Vj. Given normality, each price must be linear in order
flows. When only the sum must be zero, prices need not equal expected 
returns, an so need not be linear in order flows any longer.
6 Most modern exchanges have a "big screen" or TV monitors that 
provide information on all, or at least many, order flows.
103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in forming conditional expectations about each return, but once these 
expectations are formed, demands will be determined independently).
To be sure, this is not the only way of generating 
cross-effects. Traditional models do so in at least two ways.
Imperfect information and risk-aversion make traders concerned about the 
portfolio variance. Alternatively, with short-selling restrictions (or 
a budget constraint), traders equate marginal net benefits per dollar 
invested across securities7. In either case, demands Eire jointly 
determined.
Our preference for an informational assumption about the market 
maker, to create a link between demands, is due only in part to its 
novelty. We consider the practice of popular business commentators who 
refer to groups of securities (e.g., "chemical stocks", "food 
companies", etc.) as indirect evidence consistent with the view that a 
market maker can learn significantly more about one security by using 
even the order flows of other securities.
A5 Both the informed trader and the market maker have rational
expectations, i.e. the informed trader correctly anticipates the market 
maker’s pricing rules, and the market maker has a correct conjecture 
about the informed trader’s strategy.
In passing, we would like to note that shortselling restrictions 
or discretionary cross-sectional liquidity trading would generate a link 
between demands even when underlying returns Eire uncorrelated.
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The time structure of the model is summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 —  Time Structure of Basic Model
Date Event
t = 0 The informed trader receives private 
information
t = 1 The informed trader submits demands, 
taking into account the market makers’ pricing 
strategy, while noise traders submit their 
random demands. The market maker observes 
only aggregate order flows.
t = 2 Market makers set prices conditional on 
order flows, and absorb any excess supply or 
meet any excess demand.
t = 3 Terminal values are realized, and 
terminal payoffs are consumed.
3. EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, because of the normality of all random 
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variables (and following Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)), 
we consider an equilibrium with linear pricing rules, given by:
We show that such an equilibrium is unique, and provide an 
explicit characterization. We also demonstrate formally that it is a 
generalization of Kyle (1985).
We use the notation for the strategies of the informed trader 
and the market maker given in the previous section. Profits of the 
informed trader are given by:
n - (v - p)Tx (3)
where the superscript ’t ’ denotes the transpose, and the vector of 
prices, p, depends on market maker’s pricing rules, i.e.
p = P(w) = P(x + z ) (4)
The informed traders strategies X are functions from the realization of
the random variable s = (s^, s^, ...,s ) to quantities traded:
x = X(s) (5)
So we may write
re = 7i(X(s), P(w)) (6)
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Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a pair X, P, such that the following 
conditions hold.
(a) Profit maximization:
For any signal vector s, and for any alternate trading strategy
X ’
E(ti(X(s ) , P(w) |s = s)) £ E(n(X’ (s), P(w) |s = s)) (7)
(b) Market efficiency:
The pricing rule P satisfies:
PCw) = E(v|w = w) (8)
We derive the equilibrium via a series of lemmas.
LEMMA 3.1: If pricing rules are linear (affine), i.e. P(w) = Aq + A ^ ,
then, if an equilibrium exists,
(a) the optimal strategies of the informed trader (if they exist) are 
linear in the signal vector s:
x = B q + B^s (9)
(b) (A^ + A*) and Bj are both nonsingular.
Proof: (a) For any s = s, the trader’s optimization problem Is given
by:
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Max E {(v - P(x + z))Tx|s = s} = (10)
(x>
= Max E{ (v - A - A x - A z)Tx|s = s} (11)0 1 1 1
(x>
First-order conditions imply:
(Ax + A^)x = [E(v|s = s) - Aq - = (12)
= lv + 2 (2 + 2  )_1(s - v) -  A - A 5] (13)v v e o i
Since the RHS is linear in s, x must be linear in s.
(b) Using (9) and equating coefficients, we get
(A + A*)B = Zv(Zv + 2 )-1 (14)
Since the RHS of (14) is nonsingular, an equilibrium solution exists 
only if (Ai + A^) and are both nonsingular. (This is important 
because we can restrict our search for an equilibrium accordingly, and 
this is enough to guarantee invertibility of all subsequent expressions 
assumed invertible. Of course, we must check in the end that our 
candidate A j and B i do satisfy the above requirement). Then the 
informed trader’s optimal strategies are given by (9), provided the 
following second-order condition hold: (Aj + A*) should be positive
semi-definite. Since ^  + A*) is nonsingular, we can assert that 
(Aj + A*) must be positive definite (i.e. Aj must be positive 
quasi-definite). These second-order conditions will be critical in
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helping us establish both existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
LEMMA 3.2: In an equilibrium, we must have:
Bi = (Ai + + Ze)_1 (15)
Bq = (Ax + A^)_1[v - Zv(Zy + 2c )_1v “ Aq - A ^ ]  (16)
Aa = [Bi(Zv + + Sz ( B ^ ) " V 1]“1 (17)
Aq = v - Ai[Bq + B ^  + z] (18)
and Ai must be positive quasi-definite.
Proof: Solving (13) for x, we get:
x = (A + a V ^ v  + Z (Z + Z )_1(s  - v) - A - A z] (19)1 1  v v e o i
Using (9) and equating coefficients (15) and (16) follow. (17) and (18) 
follow from the market makers’ inference problem: details are consigned
to the Appendix. As we said, positive quasi-definiteness comes from the 
second order condition. ■
Remark-. (15) =* ^  + A*)-1 = B ^  + Sg )Z‘1 (20)
Note that this means that B ^ Z ^  + S^JZ"1 is symmetric positive definite. 
Remark: The second-order condition in Lemma 3.1, and the definition of
BJ in (15), tell us that under perfect private information (i.e. if 
= Bi is a symmetric positive definite matrix, regardless of the
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structure of AJ. In the more general case of imperfect private 
information, however, the lemma tells us little about the structure of 
A i or B i> and it will turn out that though Aj is always symmetric 
positive definite, Bi has little special structure.
LEMMA 3.3: If an equilibrium exists Ai must be symmetric.
Proof: See the Appendix. ■
LEMMA 3.4: The equilibrium A is given by the positive definite
solution for Ai in:
A = - S (E + Z )_1Z A ' V 1 (21)l 4 v v e v i z  
Proof: See the Appendix. a
Remark: While the general strategy of our proof of existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium exploits the linear-Gaussian structure of the 
model, as does Kyle (1985), there is a small but important technical 
point that deserves to be noted.
If we did not exploit matrix structure, (21), as a fixed-point 
problem in terms of the elements of Ajt is a formidable non-1lnear 
problem. Even with n = 2, it involves in general a  system of four 
third-degree multivariate polynomial equations.
This would lead us to regard the discovery of a unique 
equilibrium as, in the words of Kyle (1985), "fortuitous". However, the
matrix structure makes it clear that the problem of finding an
110
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equilibrium is equivalent to finding the positive definite square root 
of a positive definite matrix; hence existence and uniqueness follow.
The effort in the proof is mainly to define the positive definite matrix
for which we need to find the square root.
Before we state the main theorem of this paper, let us state 
one more lemma.
LEMMA 3.5: The unique solution for in (21) is given by:
Ai = (MT)-1D1/2M_1 (22)
where M is an eigenmatrix which simultaneously diagonalizes 
S = i £ v (2v + 2c ) and E"1, and D is the positive definite diagonal 
matrix with diagonal elements being the roots of det(Z-1 - AS).
Proof: Details are given in the Appendix. What is interesting is that
A^ is unique even if the eigenvalues are not distinct, i.e. even when
the diagonalizing M is not unique. ■
We now provide an explicit characterization of the 
unique equilibrium.
THEOREM lj_ Assume that returns v, liquidity noise z and errors in 
private signals e, are all multinormal random vectors, and are defined 
by:
(i) v ~ N(v, Z ) (ii) z ~ N(z, E ) (iii) e ~ N(0, E ) v z e
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with v, z and e mutually independent, E and E positive definite and Eg 
positive semi-definite.
Given a linear pricing rule, P(w = w) there exists a unique 
equilibrium defined as follows:
(a) S = - E (E + E )-1E4 v v C v
(b) M is a nonsingular matrix such that:
(i) MTSM = I (ii) MTS-1M = D
where D is the positive definite diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements
are the eigenvalues of E -1 in the metric of S, i.e. the roots of
det(E-1 - AS).
The price vector is p = Aq + A ^ ,  where
= (MT)-1D1/2M_1 (23)
Aq = v  - A z (24)
and demand strategies x = Bq + I^s, where
Bi = = \ Ai1Sv(Zv + Ze)_1 (25)
BQ = -B v (26)
Proof: Lemma 3.5 gives us (23). (A22) in the Appendix gives us (25).
(24) and (26) come from (16) and (18), after some algebra. It is then 
straightforward to verify that (Ai + A*) and are both nonsingular, 
which completes the proof. B
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Remark: For the single asset case, (21) can be solved easily for:
2<r
(27)
and
1/22<r
B,l 1/2 (28)
(( 2
which tally with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, p. 10), equations (5) and 
(4).
Putting = 0 gives us the original Kyle (1985, p. 1319)
result8.
4. GENERAL PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIUM
We shall now identify some general properties of this model.
It is important to note that in the general case —  i.e. when we allow 
imperfect private information with a general covariance matrix of 
errors, in addition to a general covariance structure for returns and 
noise —  we have both the correlated-regressors effect and a strategic
The actual statement of Theorem 1 in Kyle (1985, p. 1319) 
contains a typographical error. The coefficient in A (equivalent to our 
A 1) should be 1/2, and not 2. Subsequent computations in that paper are
however based on the correct value.
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effect. Thus, as in Admati (1985) we still have some ambiguities which 
do not exist in the case of asset pricing models like the CAPM with 
exogenous, homogeneous beliefs. However, strategic behavior ensures 
that the equilibrium in our model has simpler structure, relative to 
Admati (1985), in a sense that we shall make more precise in this 
section. In particular, under the same general restriction that prices 
be linear in information, we find that our model exhibits some 
theoretical regularities, even with imperfect private information, which 
are of value for an important class of empirical applications in 
accounting and finance, a class of "event studies".
One property of the equilibrium in this model —  as we have 
already noted in Lemma 3.3 —  is that A is symmetric. This tells us 
that regardless of the extent of asymmetry across assets, the ith price 
responds to the jth order flow exactly as the jth price responds to the 
ith order flow, for any i and j. While this ultimately reflects the 
balance between various complex interactive effects, it will help build 
intuition to consider a heuristic explanation of how strategic behavior 
helps achieve this balance.
Assume that asset "i" is characterized by a very high level of 
liquidity noise; this makes the trader more aggressive in trading asset 
"i", relative to some other asset "j" which has less noise, since there 
is more camouflage. This makes the informativeness of order flows the 
same for both assets: order flow "i" is as useful in predicting return
"j" as order flow "j" in predicting return "i". So a market maker’s 
priors are modified "in the same way" for every asset. The market 
makers’ matrix of response coefficients are like a ratio of
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prior-to-posterior precisions (remember that in equilibrium, by virtue 
of the market efficiency requirement, prices equal expected returns, 
i.e. prices are like regression functions). Since the prior 
variance-covariance matrix is symmetric, given the same degree of 
improvement in precision from observing order flows, this symmetry is 
preserved in the market maker’s pricing rule.
This is an argument to show that is symmetric even when 
liquidity noise varies across assets. A similar argument can be 
constructed to account for differences in return variances and error 
variances. This symmetry property, which holds quite generally in our 
model, is a testable proposition, given the recent availability of 
transaction data, which permits us to construct measures of order flows.
PROPOSITION 4.1: The equilibrium price vector, as a function of the
signal vector S and the noise vector z is given by:
p = v + \ 2v(Zv + S j Y S  - v) + k z  (29)
Proof’. Notice that
p = A* + A*w = A* + A*B* + A V S  + k z
from the equilibrium values of A , A , B , o’ i’ o’
In particular, the coefficient matrix A*B*
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and the proposition follows 
and B ^  after some algebra. 
= i S (E + S )_1.
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PROPOSITION 4.2: The conditional distribution of the ith price, p ^,
given the ith signal, is stochastically increasing in the 
realization of ŝ -. if s* > s^, then (pjs|) dominates (pjs^) in the 
sense of strict first-order stochastic dominance. The same is true for 
the conditional distribution of p  ̂ given the ith return, and for 
( s j p ^  and
Proof: Since (s^, p a n d  (i^, p^) are both bivariate normal random
variables, to establish the claim, we only need to consider the 
covariance matrix of (s, p) and, respectively, (v, p), and check if the 
diagonal elements are positive. The first covariance matrix is ^ Z ; 
the second, ^ SV (2V + Since both matrices are positive
definite, the diagonal elements must be positive. ■
Proposition 4.2 tells us about the relationship between the ith 
price and the ith signal, allowing other variables to very freely. 
However, it is the diagonal elements of the coefficient matrix in the 
price function of Proposition 4.1, ^ E (Z + E g ) 1 that are the "partial 
derivatives" of each price with respect to its own signal: they measure
the change in price "holding other things fixed".
Remark: As in Admati (1985), these diagonal elements are not
necessarily positive: the coefficient matrix - Z (Z + Z )-1 is the2 v v c
product of two symmetric positive definite matrices, and therefore does 
not have any special structure itself. The following examples show that 
the diagonal elements can be negative: this means that the ith price 
could, ceteris paribus, be decreasing in the ith signal.
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Consider the following numerical example.
2v = [ 1 9 I 2 = [
1-9 ioo I l-ioo i o o o :
This yields the coefficient matrix:
1.0962 0.0109\ Z (Z + s j " 1 = I
9.6165 -0.0939
and the following equilibrium matrices Ai and B ^
'0.0681 -0.4951
•0.4951 4.3670
f 0.2474 0.0124
B h ib } =
J [-1.0744 -0.0093
To understand this example it is useful to begin by considering the 
effect of correlated error t^rms in the two private signals. If the 
value of, say, signal 2, increases, then the trader knows that on 
average the return on asset 2 would increase: this is the "direct
effect" of signal 2 on the trader’s belief about asset 2. But if errors 
are, as in our example, highly correlated, then signal 2 is also 
informative about the error in signal 1. Since the correlation among 
errors is negative, a higher value of signal 2 could also imply a lower 
value of the error in signal 1. This implies that the return on asset 1
117
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could be higher, and since it is strongly negatively correlated with the
return on asset 2, this means a lower return on asset 2. This is the
"indirect effect" of signal 2 on the trader’s belief about asset 2,
which, in our example, is opposite in sign from the "direct effect".
In our example, the "direct effect" is very weak, because signal 2 is
very imprecise (the variance of is 10001) and the "indirect effect"
dominates (sifter taking into account the "strategic effect", of
revelation via order flows) to the point of making negative. The
market maker realizes that there is a possibility of a less aggressive
response from the trader to his own information, and compensates for
this by placing substantially more weight (4.3670) on the second order
flow. Since in equilibrium A*B* = - S  (E + 2 )-1 (the coefficient l l 2 v v e
matrix), when this weight is sufficiently large, the response of price 2 
to the signal on asset 2 can become negative.
It is interesting to note that even if this "indirect effect" 
is not so strong as to make negative, the response of price 2 to the 
return on asset 2 may still be negative. This is demonstrated in the 
following example.
Example #2
10001
This yields the coefficient matrix:
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The parameters for this example are the same as for the previous 
example, except for the weaker negative correlation among errors. In 
this case, b ^  is positive (and the weight the market maker places on 
order flow 2 is also smaller). Yet the coefficient on signal 2 in price 
2 is negative.
This highlights the other source of a negative effect. Given 
the negative correlation among returns and errors, the market maker 
places negative weights on cross-order flows, while the trader still 
places a positive weight on signal 2 in forming a demand for asset 1, 
because of the "indirect effect". The negative contribution from this 
term (-0.3511)(0.0101) dominates the other (positive) contribution.
Thus we see from these two examples, that though A i s  always
symmetric positive definite, little can be said in general about the
coefficient matrix A B  = - Z (2 + Z ) 1. Also, since B* can be 1 1 2  v v c i
non-symmetric, we cannot identify any special properties of Bj beyond 
its existence, uniqueness, and an explicit form in terms of primitive
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parameter matrices.
While the technical reason for this ambiguity result is the 
same as in Admati (1985) —  we have a product of symmetric matrices —  
some reflection suggests that the coefficient matrix in our model is 
simpler. For one thing, it is independent of Z , the noise covariance 
matrix. This generalizes the Kyle (1985) result, that more noise leads 
to more aggressive trading, so that the informativeness of order flows 
is the same, and independent of the level of noise. For another, as we 
shall demonstrate in Proposition 4.3 below, we can identify simple 
sufficient conditions on Z^ and Z£ to ensure positive partial 
derivatives. In the model of Admati (1985), all three parameter 
matrices are involved, and it is hard to obtain such simple sufficient 
conditions.
PROPOSITION 4.3: (Sufficient Conditions For Positive Partial
Derivatives Of Prices With Respect To Their Own Signals)
The diagonal elements of the coefficient matrix of Proposition 
4.1, ^ ^ ( Z ^  + 1* be positive if any of the following
conditions hold:
(a) Z = AZ , A 2 0e v
(b) Z is diagonal.
(c) Zg is diagonal.
Proof: (a) The proof is trivial.
(b) The formula for the ith diagonal element is (denoting 
°v(i j) as the element in Z^, and so on):
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since <r̂ (i 0 for i * j, and since Z^ + Zg is symmetric positive
definite.
(c) For this part, it is useful to first state a  lemma.
LEMMA 4.1: Let A and B be symmetric positive semi-definite matrices.
Then detCA + B) a det(A).
Proof: See Bellman (1970, p. 117, Theorem 3).
The formula for the ith diagonal element of + ^ J " 1 is:
Define a  matrix C s {c > J vl >J)
tJ I Ccr + o- ) otherwise ̂ v e (t,j)
In other words, is identical to Z^ + Z£ except possibly for the ith
diagonal element. Therefore, elements in the ith column of (Z + Z )-1
v e
are just the corresponding elements of the ith column of the adjoint of 
Cj, divided by a scale factor, det(Z^ + Z£ ). Thus (30) can be 
interpreted as the dot product of the ith row of and the ith column 
of the adjoint of (modified by a scale factor). Then, using the 
well-known result that for any matrix J, J-adjoint (J) = det(J)-I, (30) 
is equivalent to det(Cj)/det(Zv + Z^), which is positive since both the 
numerator and the denominator are positive. The denominator is positive
CJ.n (30)
[<r t = j = i
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since S + Zc is positive definite; the numerator, since Lemma 4.1 tells 
us that det(C ) a det(Z ) > 0 .  ■
While (a) seems to be a strong condition, it is important to 
note the class of admissible matrices for which it holds extends beyond 
the perfect information case (X = 0). The condition stipulates that 
large variances or covariances among returns are associated with large 
variances or covariances among errors. Parts (b) and (c) show that 
diagonal elements in the price coefficient matrix can be positive, even 
without requiring it to be symmetric positive definite. It is also 
important to note that since the product of two continuous functions is 
a continuous function, even if the conditions in Proposition 4.3 are not 
met exactly, for matrices "sufficiently close" to the matrices in these 
conditions, the diagonal elements in the price coefficient matrix will 
still be positive. Proposition 4.3 should be useful for applications as 
in experimental economics, where they provide an easy way of obtaining a 
price coefficient matrix with desirable properties.
The general possibility of ambiguous response coefficients was 
noted in the context of perfect competition by Admati (1985). Her 
results were both important and disturbing. They were important because 
they were the result of extending the model of Hellwig (1980) to a 
multi-asset setting with a general correlation structure, which is 
presumably the more realistic assumption to make. While Admati (1985) 
predicted that a general model would pave the way for applications, our 
considered view is that this has not happened, for a  simple reason. The 
generalization involved a serious loss of predictive content.
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
To understand this, it will help to consider a well-defined 
class of applications in accounting and finance called "event studies".
A good example would be studies examining the informational efficiency 
of prices with respect to earnings announcements (see e.g. Gonedes, 
Dopuch, Penman (1976)). In the context of an asset pricing model like 
the CAPM —  with exogenous and homogeneous beliefs —  it is easy to 
assert that "good news", i.e. predictions about above-average terminal 
values captured in above-average earnings should cause prices to go up, 
since each price will always be increasing in its own return.
Given the vast increase in the number of models with private 
information, a natural question to ask is: if we make the more
realistic assumption that significant private information exists, can we 
continue to use traditional event study procedures, in particular 
pooling of (unexpected return, unexpected earnings) observations to 
assess "information content"? Admati’s work shows that the expected 
price reaction to a prediction of above-average terminal values can be 
ambiguous. So we cannot justify pooling of observations any more, even 
if our concern is only with the sign of the association.
One way to resolve this problem would be to estimate primitive 
parameters, and then compute the estimated price coefficient matrix, 
which would give us the sign of the expected price reaction. Given the 
explosive growth in the number of parameters in these models, the 
general problem has never even been attempted.
We know that even in our case, unless we impose appropriate 
restrictions, the problem remains. The next proposition tells us, 
however, that our model which adds to the realistic assumption of
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
private information another dose of realism, strategic behavior, can be 
useful for a slightly different class of event studies (sometimes called 
"reverse regression models"). Technically, it is a simple consequence 
of having market makers condition on all order flows in setting each 
price, and of the equilibrium A being invertible. This means that for 
an econometrician to observe ex post the vector of prices is equivalent 
to observing the vector of order flows. Since market makers extract 
information optimally from order flows in setting each price, to learn 
about the ith return it is sufficient to condition on the ith price.
PROPOSITION 4.4: (a) All public information about the ith return is
always contained in the ith price.
(b) The informativeness of prices, measured by the 
reduction in the prior variance-covariance matrix of the return vector, 
when we condition on the vector of prices, Var(v) - Var(v|p), is given 
by | 2y(2y +
Proof: What part (a) asserts is that V a r C v J p ^  = Var(vjp). To see
why this is true we must compute the variance-covariance matrix of the 
partitioned vector [v, p]. This is given by the appropriately 
partitioned matrix below.
2v I y s v + v ' X  ”
1 2 (2 + 2 )_12 22 v v e v p 
But using (29), we get:
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Z = 7 S (Z + Z J ' M z  + 2 )(Z + 2 J _1Zp 4 v v e v e v  e v
- 2 (2 + 2  )_1B_12 (BT )_1(2 + 2 )_12
4 v  v C 1 z  1 v e v
so (31) implies
Denote by cr the (i, i)-element of 2 (2 + 2  )-12 and by a- , the itn
i i  v v e  v  l
column vector of the same matrix. Then
Var(v Ip) = (r - - a - (-a- )~1-- cr = o* - - <r 
i ' m  v t l . l )  2  11 2 11 2 11 v ( l , l )  2 11
and
Var(v|p) = ,  ( M ) - 1 Sv(Zv ♦ - 1 ^
Part (b) follows from joint normality, and our definition of
Note that 2 is identical to the two off-diagonal blocks of
p
Z^ p. Thus expected returns v given prices p is simply:
E(v|p = p) = v + I(p - v) = p (3:
and we see that only the ith price is useful in predicting the 
ithreturn.
Though a regression of prices on terminal values involved a 
non-diagonal coefficient matrix, the corresponding reverse regression
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involves only a diagonal matrix. This is one subtle difference between 
the multivariate case and univariate case, in which a non-zero 
coefficient in a regression implies a non-zero coefficient in the 
corresponding reverse regression. The practical value of this 
proposition lies in the justification it provides for reverse-regression 
based event studies (e.g. Beaver, Lambert, Ryan (1986)), even in 
settings assumed to allow for private information.
variance-covariance matrix, tells us that with perfect information 
(S£ = 0 ) ,  as in Kyle (1385), only half the information is incorporated 
in prices. From a purely theoretical perspective this is interesting in 
view of the great scarcity of robust results in models with private 
information. Given a linear pricing rule, regardless of the underlying 
correlation structure, as market makers try and learn from all order 
flows, the trader tries to minimize such learning (to the extent 
consistent with optimization) so that, in equilibrium, market makers 
learn about each return only as much as they would in a single-security 
world.
PROPOSITION 4.5: The informed trader’s ex ante expected profits are
given by:
Part (b), which follows from the computation of the posterior
Finally, we record a general proposition about profits.
t r a c e ( B ^ )  - i trace (34)
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Proof:
ECfc) = E{[v - Aq - AjXCs) - A z]TX(s)}
Substituting equilibrium values, and simplifying we get an expectation 
of a  sum of two quadratic forms, in (v - v) and (s - vj. The 
expectation of these quadratic forms, with respect to v and s 
respectively, is easily accomplished using Graybill (1983, p. 341). ■
5. PERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION
In this section we continue to allow the correlation structure 
associated with returns and with noise trading to be completely general, 
but we now assume that private information is perfect. This special 
case is important because it is a setting in which we can rule out the 
"correlated-regressors effect" which can create "perverse" predictions 
of asset returns. This highlights the power of the "strategic effect", 
which, we shall see, can neutralize all of the correlation due to 
returns and noise, and distill "joint" effects into "pure" effects.
PROPOSITION 5.1: Under perfect private information, the equilibrium
solution is given by:
(i) i MTZvM = I
(ii) m V m  = D
(iii) A* = (MT)-1D 1/2M-1
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(iv) b " = i a ;1
(v) A* = v - A* z
(vi) B* = -B* vo 1
(Proofs Eire omitted in this section since they all follow from setting
2 = 0 . )c
Proposition 5.1 tells us that under perfect private 
information, we are in a position to assert not only the symmetry and 
positive definiteness of A , but also the symmetry and positive 
definiteness of B ^  despite possible asymmetries across assets 
pertaining to returns and liquidity noise.
PROPOSITION 5.2: The equilibrium variance-covariance matrix of the
partitioned vector [v, p] is given by the following (conformably 
partitioned) matrix:
This demonstrates the remarkable robustness of the original 
Kyle (1985) result, that with one informed trader and perfect private 
information, the posterior precision is exactly twice the prior 
precision.
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PROPOSITION 5.3: The equilibrium price vector p, as a function of the
return vector v and the noise vector z, is given by:
p = v + ^ (v - v) + A i z ■
Regardless of the correlation structure, prices are always 
strictly increasing in their own returns. Also, market makers, who do
not have any access to private information, and who must rely
exclusively upon (imperfect and correlated) order flow information, set 
prices "as if" each price is determined only by its own return.
The relative robustness of these results stands in stark 
contrast to the general flavor of results under imperfect information, 
where a slight perturbation in the information structure can often 
sharply change the nature of equilibrium. Essentially, the only real 
restriction in our analysis is that of a linear equilibrium (which is 
also true of most models in the literature on perfect-competition 
rational expectations equilibrium).
6. A TWO-ASSET EXAMPLE
The matrix treatment we have adopted so far in this paper has
been convenient for handling the general n-asset case. However, this
obscures the role of individual elements of different 
variance-covariance matrices in the analysis, and in particular, it 
tells us very little about the effect of correlation parameters (which
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are after all what makes the multi-asset case qualitatively different 
from the single-asset case). To rectify this and to build more 
intuition, we now study in detail a two-asset example, with perfect 
private information and with all variances equal to unity. This enables 
us to examine limits and comparative statics involving the return 
correlation parameter, p , and the noise correlation parameter, p . We 
also illustrate all of the propositions in this paper.
with both p and p e (-1, 1), we obtain the following diagonal matrix
Given the parameter matrices below:
1 P,
1
Z
D, where the diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of Z_1 in the metric
1 0(1 + pv)(l + pz)
D = 10 (1 - py)(l - pz )
These eigenvalues yield the following eigenmatrix M:
1______ ______1
V 2 i l + p )  t/  2(1 - p )
M =
-1   -1
/  2(1 + p j  / 2 U ~ ^ T 7
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We now state various propositions pertaining to this example, 
the proofs of which are mainly computational.
PROPOSITION B.l: In equilibrium,
(i) the "own-coefficients" in the pricing rule are:
_ i [ / T"r ^ \
311 a22 4 [v 1 “ p V l  + p J
(ii) the "cross-coefficients" in the pricing rule are:
= _i [/TUT- nm
ai2 S21 4 [/ 1 - P Vl + P
(iii) the "own-coefficients" in the demand strategies are:
bn  - - 1 [/i-nF* fr^F}
(iv) the "cross-coefficients" in the demand strategies are:
^ = b2. = s [ / r ^  -  / r ^
Table 2 below collects information about limits and Table 3 
about comparative statics. Figures 1-4 illustrate the behavior of the 
four sets of coefficients for different values of p and p . As the 
trader disguises her strategy by placing less weight on the ith 
security, the market maker compensates for this by putting more weight
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on the ith order flow in determining the ith price. As both p , p -> 0, 
we have ’ri independent "Kyle markets", as can be verified by comparing 
our coefficients with the corresponding coefficients in Kyle (1985, p. 
1319).
Table 2 —  Limits
Pz ^  1 pz-> -1 p — > 0
b l i
1 1 1
2
1 + 1 
/l+p /l-pv £ ( i+p v ) v4(1-pv)
b i J
i  * J
1 -1 1
2
1________ 1
/l+p /l-pV2C1+PV ) v£(l-pv)
3 l i CO
i/l+p + /l-p 
4
a iJ
1 * J
-CO CO /l+p - /l-p 
4
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Table 2 —  Limits (continued)
p v- >  1 Py-> -1 p v-> o Pv. Pz~> 0
b li 00
/l+p + i/l-p 
2
1
i * J
CO /l+pz - /l-pz 
2
0
1 i
1 1 1
4
' 1 + 1 ' 
/l+p / - p
1
22 v4(1+Pz) 2v&(l-p )'
au  
i * J
1 -1 1
4
‘__1________ 1 '
/l+pz /l-p’
0
2v4(1+p ) 2i/k(l-p )
Table 3 —  Comparative Statics
Own-coefficients
S b ^  > 0  if p > 0, p > -p 
Sp^ < 0  if p v< 0, pv< -pz
3au  < 0  if p v> -pz 
Sp^ > 0  if pv< -pz
3bu  < 0 if p > -p^ 
3pz > 0  if p^< -p^
S a ^  > 0  if pz> 0, pz> -p^ 
3pz < 0  if p z< 0, pz< -p^
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Table 3 —  Comparative Statics (continued) 
Cross-coefficients For i * j
abu  — ^  > 0
3pz
aau < 0
apz
8b
- L L <  o
Spv
da
- i ± >  0
Spv
(INSERT FIGURES 1-4 HERE)
Cross-effects on prices provide a new explanation for why the 
nature of news (good or bad) may not always be related to the demand for 
a security in an intuitive way. Even if there is very good news about a 
particular security, if it is strongly positively correlated with 
another security, a trader would choose to "dampen" demand in a bid to 
keep both prices down. This is why the cross-coefficients i * j,
become negative. It is important to realize that there is a cost —  
foregone opportunities —  in trying to reduce what the market maker may 
learn, and therefore this "cross-effect" may not always dominate the 
"own-effect". In Proposition 6.2 below, we record the regions in (v^ 
v^)-space, in which such "counterintuitive" effects on demand will 
occur.
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i^) then Xj < 0 even if
v^) then x t > 0 even if
v^  then x t > 0 even if
vt) then Xj < 0 even if
-bii y  (1 - PvH l  + p j  + /  (1 + PvH l  - p j
where —  = ------------------ --------------------------
lJ /(I + p )(1 - p )’ - /(I - p )(1 + p ) ■
In (i) above, the cross-coefficient b ^  < 0, hence 
( - b ^/b^) > 0. Thus, for very large - v^, even if v t - v  ̂ is 
positive, the informed trader would minimize revelation about v  ̂ by 
holding a negative position in asset i, and try to reap large returns by 
holding asset j. Conversely, if v^ - v^ is very negative, as in (ii), 
even if is negative, the trader would seek a positive position
in asset i, which would boost both prices, and make profits by selling 
asset j.
It is worth stressing that these "cross-effects" arise in our 
model solely as a consequence of strategic behavior, i.e. as a result of 
the interactions between the market maker’s incentive to learn, and the 
informed trader’s incentive to reduce such learning. Analyses of
135
PROPOSITION 6.2: For p > p , Vi, i * j
(i) If (Vj - v )  > (-i)ii/ b j)(vi -
(ii) If (vs - v^  < (-U1/i>1J)(''1 -
V 1 < V
For p < p , Vi, i * j
(iii) If (Vj - Vj) > (~b l/ bl}'>(vl ~
v <
(iv) If (Vj - Vj) < (-~b l/ bli^ v l ~
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correlated environments under perfect competition (e.g. Admati (1985)) 
ignore —  by the very definition of perfect competition —  the latter 
effect, of trying to reduce what others can learn, and consider only the 
possibility of learning. Thus we see that while with perfect private 
information we cannot have the various ambiguities cited in Admati 
(1985) —  all of which stem from the ambiguities associated with 
predictions of terminal values —  strategic behavior can help generate 
other kinds of "non-intuitive" results. Whether (in a more general 
model) the purely statistical effect identified by Admati (1985) and the 
strategic effect we have focused on will reinforce or neutralize each 
other is, ultimately, an empirical question: it will depend on the
actual parametrization.
The equilibrium variance-covariance matrix of (i^, v^, p^, pg) 
is given by:
This illustrates Proposition 5.2.
Some features of the relationship between returns and prices 
are very simple. For example,
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Cov(v , p t) = I
sigmCovti^, p^)> = sign (py) Vi, i * j
V a r C v J p ^  = V a r C v J ^ ,  Pj) = i  Vi, i * j
all of which are intuitive. Allowing other variables to vary freely, 
good news about one security’s return would increase its own price, and 
the other price as well, if the returns are positively correlated.
Also, all information about the ith return is contained in the ith 
price.
We now use this to compute expected profits.
PROPOSITION 6.3: The ex ante expected profits of the informed trader
are given by:
E(Jr) = i trace(B*Sv) = |  [/ ( l  - p )(1 - p ) + / ( I  + p )(1 + p ) ] (35)
(INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE)
If p = 0 ,  we see in Figure 5 that profits are highest when 
Pv = 0. As |p | increases, order flows become more revealing due to 
"cross-effects", and so profits decline. If p = 0 ,  profits are highest 
when p = 0. As |p j increases, liquidity traders provide less 
"camouflage", and hence profits decline. In general, the trader 
benefits the most if p = p , i.e. revelation is minimized when returns 
and liquidity noise correlations change similarly, and so preserve the 
level of camouflage.
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One interesting issue arises when we recognize that even with
two risky projects, a firm may sometimes choose to issue only one
security. How does a firm make this securitization decision (or, for an
existing firm, the capital restructuring decision)? A general answer is
beyond the scope of this paper —  it will involve, for instance, also an
analysis of the allocation of voting rights, as in Grossman and Hart
(1988). However, for the limited case of established firms (controlled
by purely speculative managers) deciding whether to merge or spinoff,
Proposition 6.4 identifies one incentive. We assume that managers are
able to participate in the market, and anticipate access to private
information after the securitization decision has been made.
Assume the same fundamentals as the rest of this section. But
assume that there is only one security, and that all liquidity traders
now deal in this one security, i.e. z = z + z ~ N(z + z , <r2 ) where
1 2  1 2 z
<r2 = <r2 + <r2 + 2 p  cr <r = 2(1 + p ), and the return 
z  z l  z 2  r z  z l  z2 ' z
v = v + v ~ N(v + v , <r2) where tr2 = <r2 + <r2 + 2p <r <r =
1 2  1 2 v v vl  v2 v vl  v2
2(1 + py).
PROPOSITION 6.4: The trader’s ex ante expected profits with one
security would be:
This exceeds the expected profits with two securities (given in 
(35)), if and only if p > p . ■
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(INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE)
Figure 6 illustrates the comparison for p = 0. When pv > p^, 
i.e. when the returns are sufficiently positively correlated (or 
insufficiently negatively correlated), the manager is better off with a 
single security because less is then revealed of her private information 
about each project. When p < p^, a different effect dominates: by
issuing two securities, she is able to better discriminate or exploit 
divergent opportunities (i.e. she can go long in one while going short 
in the other), which are more likely to arise when p < p i.e. when the 
returns are sufficiently negatively correlated (or insufficiently 
positively correlated), and this benefit exceeds the negative impact of 
greater revelation.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a model of multi-asset pricing. In 
contrast to the traditional CAPM our model recognizes the existence of 
private information, and strategic interaction between the informed and 
uninformed. Unlike the perfect competition rational expectations model 
which has little predictive content because of the dominance of the 
correlated-regressors effect, in our model strategic behavior restores 
some regularities, even in the general case with imperfect private 
information. All public information about a security’s return is 
contained in its own price. In fact, all of the correlatedness due to
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returns and noise can be neutralized. This is because an informed 
trader realizes that market makers can learn from correlated variables, 
and so has an incentive to manipulate order flows, and "lower" the 
correlation.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we provide details pertaining to various 
results in the paper.
Note: Whenever we refer to a positive definite (or
semi-definite) matrix in this paper, :.t should be understood to meLsi a 
symmetric positive definite (or semi-definite) matrix.
Before we consider our model itself, it will be useful to state 
a well-known result in linear algebra which we use in the sequel.
LEMMA Al: Let A be an nxn positive definite matrix; and B, an rtxn
positive semi-definite matrix.
There exists a nonsingular real matrix F such that:
(i) FTAF = I and (ii) FTBF = D
where I refers to the identity matrix and D to a positive definite 
diagonal matrix whose diagonal values are given by the roots 
(eigenvalues) of the characteristic equation of B in the metric of A:
det(B - AA)
The matrix F is unique if the eigenvalues are distinct. If the 
eigenvalues are not distinct, the eigenvectors corresponding to repeated 
roots may be replaced by any independent linear combination.
Proof: See Franklin (1968, p. 106). ■
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The reader should note that the variance-covariance matrices
associated with returns and liquidity trading noise, Z and Z , are 
assumed to be positive definite, while the variance-covariance matrix of 
errors in private signals, Z£ , is positive semi-definite (i.e., we allow 
for perfect private information on some or all assets).
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Since the signal vector is given by s = v + e, and
the order flow vector by w = Bq + + z, the variance-covariance
matrix of (v , w) is
* vb ;>1
B Z v z
Then,
P(w) = E(v|w = w) =
= v + Z BT [b (Z + Z )BT + Z 1 v x [ i v c i  ZJ
r1
(w - Bq - B ^  - z) (Al)
So we have, using (2) and equating coefficients
i-i[b (Z + Z )Z_1 + z (bW 1I _ l v  C v  z l  v (A2)
(Note, this means that Aj is invertible.)
and
(A3)
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Proof of Lemma 3.3: Let us solve for Bi and Aj. From (A2) and (20),
and since and (A^ + A^) are both invertible, we get:
(Ax + A*)'1 = A”1 (A”1 + (A^)-1)_1(A^)-1 (
A* = + 2e )S^ . + (A5)
CA, * =
= |  ̂  (Zv+Ze ) 2^+2z (B^) " V 1 J + [b ^ + Z ^ Z ^ + Z ^ B ^ zJ  j =
= [̂bi(zv + z£)z^ + ^ (bJ-)"1 z”1 j •
• [2Bi(Zv + 2c )Z‘1 + Z^(B^)”1 Z”1 + Z"1 B*1 z j  •
• [bi(Zv + Zc )Z~x + Zv_1 B”1 z j  = (A6)
(we have used above the fact that Bi(Zv + 2e )Z^ is symmetric. )
= Bi(Zy + Zg ) Z”1 (A7)
The last equality follows from (20). Postmultiply both sides
[Bi(Zy + 2c ) ‘Zy1 + ^(B^) 12~1]"1 and postmultiply each side by
[I + Z ^ B ^ Z ^ Z ^ Z ^  + Z£ ) 1Bi1]-1. Then take inverses on both sides, and
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simplify. We will get:
B t(Sv + 2c )S“1 = • [̂ 2vC2v + 2e ) " V 1]- ^ ( B ^ V V ^
Define P = B (2 + 2  )2-11 v G v
(P is symmetric positive definite, by (20).)
=» P"1 = 2 (2 + 2  r V 1v v e i
=> B'1 = (2 + 2  )2_1P_1 i v e v
and
=*> (B*)"1 = P_12 ^ ( 2 v + 2£ )
Using (A9)-(A12), (A8) can be rewritten as:
P = + 2 J 2 " 1P'12_P~12_P"12"1(2 + E J 2 " 1
Lne
(A13) becomes:
H-1PH-1 = P ' ^ P ' ^ P " 1 (A14)
Since P is positive definite, there exists an orthogonal matrix 
F such that:
P = FTAF, where A is a diagonal matrix with the (positive) 
eigenvalues of P along the diagonal. Substituting into (A14), we get:
H-1FTAFH-1 = FTA"1F2zFTA“1F2zFTA_1F (A15)
Factoring A and A-1 into their unique positive definite square
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roots, premultiplying by A F and postmultiplying by F A , we get:
(a1/2fh"1fta1/2) (a1/2fh-1fta1/2) = ( a"1/2fz2fV 1/2) ( a'1/2fs2fV 1/2)
(A16)
Define L = A 1/2FH-1FTA1/2 and R = A"1/2FZ2FTA_1/2, 
so that (A16) becomes
LLT = RRT (A17)
Not only are LLT and RRT symmetric positive definite but so are
L and R. Since the symmetric positive definite square root of a 
symmetric positive definite matrix is unique (see, e.g. Bellman (1970), 
pp. 93-94), it is legal to write:
L = R * A 1/2FTH_1FA1/2 = A-1/2F \ F A - 1/2 (A18)
Premultiplying by FA1/2, postmultiplying by A1/2FT, and using 
the orthogonality of F, we get:
FAFTH_1FAFT = Z (A19)
=> PH_1P = Z
=> [b ^  + Z )Z_1] • [z (Z + Z )-1Z 1 • Tb, (Z + Z )Z-11 = Z
! (Z + Z„)Z" = z" B_ z
and, by symmetry of the LHS (implied by (20))
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= Z_1(Z + Z )BT = Z (BT)_1Z_1v v e l z l v 
(A21), together with (A2), establishes that
(A21)
T V 1 = \ Z_1E1 2 z
i.e., is symmetric (and positive definite).
Proof of Lemma 3.4: To get an expression for Ai in terms of the
. primitive parameter matrices Z , Z^, and Ze> note that from (A22)
B = 2Z A Z_1
Substituting (A23) in (A24), we get:
Proof of Lemma 3.5:
(a) Existence
Define S = i ^ ( Z ^  + Z ^ -^  (S is positive definite).
By Lemma Al, there exists a nonsingular matrix M such that:
(i) MTSM = I *  S = ( M W 1
=> S'1 = MMT (A26)
(ii) MTZ_1M = D * Z"1 = (MT)-1DM-1 (A27)
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(where D is a positive definite diagonal matrix with diagonal elements 
being eigenvalues of Z_1 in the metric of S, i.e., the roots of 
detCZ"1 - AS)).
Substituting (A26) into (A25), we get:
At = ( M W V V 1 =* A iMMTA i = Z'1
Premultiplying by MT, postmultiplying by M, and using (A27), we
get:
=> M ^ M M ^ M  = M V ^  = D (A28)
Factoring D into its unique positive definite square root, we
get:
M ^ M  = D1/2 (A29)
=> A = (MT)_1D1/2M_1 (A30)
(b) Uniqueness
If the eigenvalues in D above are distinct, M is unique, and
this is sufficient to establish uniqueness of A j, (and, consequently,
B . A and B ).1 0  o
But in general the eigenvalues may not be unique, and 
consequently, besides a matrix M, there may be another matrix M that 
accomplishes the simultaneous diagonalization of S and Z -1. We show 
below that though M may not be unique, Ai (and consequently B ^  Aq and 
Bq) will be unique.
For any two matrices M and M which accomplish the simultaneous
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diagonalization, define
K = M_1M (A3
From the invertibility of M and M, K is invertible.
If corresponding to M, we get Ajt and corresponding to M, we 
get A ^  to prove uniqueness we must show that ^  = AJ. We do so in 
three steps.
Step 1.
K  is orthogonal.
Proof: Since both M and M must diagonalize S into the identity, we
have:
s = ( m W 1 = (mt ) -1m-1 = c k V i^ c m k)"1
=* (MT)“1M“1 = (MT)-1 (KT)-1K-1H_1
=> c k W 1 = I
=» KKT = I =* KT = K"1
Step 2
D 1/2 = KD1/2KT
Proof: Since both M and M must diagonal ize S-1 into D, we get:
Sf1 = (MT = (MT)_1DM_1 = (MT)"1(KT)"1DK_1M"1
=*• D = (k Y ^ K -1
Using Step 1, we get:
D = KDKT
148
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(where each side has been factored into its unique positive definite 
square root)
*  D 1/2 = KD1/2KT
Step 3
From (A 30), given M,
A* = (MT)-1D1/2M_1 = (MT)"1(KT)-1D1/2K-1M~1 Cusing A31)
= (MT)"1KD1/2KTM_1 (using Step 1)
= (MT)_1D 1/2M_1 (using Step 2)
149
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Admati, A. R. (1985). "A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for 
Multi-Asset Securities Markets." Econometrica 53, 629-657.
Admati, A. R. and P. Pfleiderer (1988). "A Theory of Intraday Trading 
Patterns: Volume and Price Variability." Review of Financial
Studies 1, 3-40.
Allen, F. A. (1987). "Contracts to Sell Information." Working Paper. 
University of Pennsylvania.
Ausubel, L. M. (1988). "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations 
Economy. " Working Paper. Northwestern University.
Baumol, W. J . , J. C. Panzar and R.D. Willig (1982). Contestable Markets 
and the Theory of Industry Structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., New York.
Beaver, W.H. , R. A. Lambert and S. G. Ryan (1987). "The Information 
Content of Security Prices: A Second Look." Journal of Accounting
and Economics 9, 139-157.
Bellman, R. (1970). Introduction to Matrix Analysis (Second Edition). 
McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Caballe, J. (1988). "Strategic Behavior and Asymmetric Information in 
Financial Markets. " Department of Economics. University of 
Pennsylvania.
Franklin, J. N. (1968). Matrix Theory. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ.
150
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Gonedes, N . , N. Dopuch and S. Penman (1976). "Disclosure Rules,
Information Production, and Capital Market Equilibrium. The Case of 
Forecast Disclosure Rules." Journal of Accounting Research 14, 
89-137.
Graybi11, F. A. (1983). Matrices with Applications in Statistics. 
Wadworth International Group, Belmont, California.
Grossman, S.J. and 0. Hart (1988). "One Share/One Vote and the Market 
for Corporate Control." Working Paper. Department of Economics, 
Princeton University.
Grossman, S. J. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980). "On The Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets." American Economic Review. 70, 
393-408.
Hellwig, M. F. (1980). "On the Aggregation of Information in
Competitive Markets." Journal of Economic Theory 22, 477-498.
Kyle, A. S. (1985). "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading."
Econometrlca 53, 1315-1335.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
aS
a.*
CO
CO
ccf
152
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Q_
CL.'
Ll-
Q_~
Q-*
-dP
CO
Q.
153
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
oIQ_
=3
E
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
